Cyprus, 1955 1959: The US, Britain ann the USSR: Then Is Now

Abstract

• William Mallinson *

Using recently released documents, this paper considers the viewpoints of Britain, the US and the USSR vis -à-vis Cyprus in the crucial years between 1955 and 1959.

Having explained the author’s historical mental underpinning, the paper shows how crude Cold War geopolitical considerations dictated the approach of all three countries, whatever the moral arguments.

Η ιστορία δεν αλλάζει. Η κατανόησή της αλλάζει τα πάντα.

The documents revealed by the author show that the British colluded secretly with Turkey, and were fully aware that the Turkish Cypriot leadership had planted a bomb at the Turkish consulate, in order to instigate anti-Greek rioting, a fact covered up at the time, and only recently proven by the eventual release of British documents.

The paper demonstrates unequivocally how the whole 1959 arrangement was predicated on the Anglo-Saxons’ insistence on a NATO solution, and how critical the USSR was about an arrangement that was clearly dysfunctional. The paper concludes that external tensions, fear of Russia, and a continuing attempt to solve a problem by repeating the same errors still hold true today.

Key words: Britain, US, USSR, Cold War, geopolitics, bomb, rioting.

Introduction and Context

Before embarking on an analysis of the US’s, UK’s and USSR’s interests within the context of Cyprus during the period 1955-9, it is important to posit a mental underpinning and approach, which is essentially historical, aiming to be agenda- and ideology-free. I quote A.J.P.Taylor: ‘A historian must not hesitate even if his books lend aid and comfort to the Queen’s enemies […], or even to the common enemies of mankind.’[1] First, some background cum mental underpinning.

‘A truly independent Greece is an absurdity. Greece can either be English or Russian, and since it cannot be Russian, it is necessary that she be English.’ [2] This quote, well-known and well-worn though it may be, is still valid today, whatever lip-service is paid to the concept of the free West and the importance of national sovereignty. It is valid in understanding the strategic interests of the US, UK and USSR during the period, just as it is today, even if colours and names change. While few politicians would speak publicly in such frank terms today, the fact remains, as we shall see, that Greece, and particularly Cyprus, are on the periphery of world affairs when it comes to independence of action. Before looking specifically at Cyprus between 1955 and 1959, within the context of its political geography, I shall bully off with a brief critique of geopolitics and the dangers of the misuse of international relations theory. It is important to bear in mind Britain’s and the US’s preoccupation with Russia within the context of the Eastern Mediterranean geopolitical latrine.

As Lin Yutang wrote, putting human affairs into exact formulae shows a lack of sense of humour and therefore a lack of wisdom, while Man’s love for definitions is a step towards ignorance. The more he defined, aiming at an impossible logical perfection, the more ignorant he became.[3] So it is with much post-Sixties international relations theory[4], but especially with geopolitics, a ‘primitive form of IR theory’, as Christopher Hill calls it.[5] Geopolitics as a modern label is closely associated with the obsession of big powers to gain yet more power, through the control of resources, which includes the possession of military bases, such as in Cyprus. Despite its close association with the imperialist-minded Mackinder, and Nazi advisor Haushofer, it was Kissinger, of all people, who helped to slide the term back into current international relations terminology, by using it as a synonym for balance-of-power politics.[6] The term is often used by politicians, who sometimes ignorantly interchange it with the term ‘geostrategy’. With the increasingly desperate struggle for the world’s resources, oil and gas pipelines almost become geographical maps. Old style borders, encompassing culturally and homogenous groups of people, become less relevant in the eyes of the geopolitician. As Hill writes, the random way in which frontiers are superimposed on the world means that states vary enormously in size, mineral wealth, access to the sea, vulnerability, and cohesiveness.[7] A look at a map of the Middle East is enough to show how cynically Britain and France carved up much of the area following the Sykes-Picot deal, to suit their geopolitical lusts. The medium and long-term results have been increasing tension in the area ever since. In the case of Cyprus, its location was to prove, and continues to prove, to be a painful experience for its people.

Let us now put those vital years of 1955 to 1959 into context, years whose characteristics are still very much with us.

British Cyprus: the Strategic Asset.

Even before the term ‘geopolitics’ was de rigueur, Britain had obtained Cyprus for strategic (let us therefore also use the crude term ‘geopolitical’) reasons, in a secret deal with the Ottomans during the Great Eastern Crisis and the Congress of Berlin. Yet by 1947, with decolonisation beginning, the Foreign Office was seriously considering giving up Cyprus, but decided that Cold War considerations took precedence over international morality:

Cyprus is in fact the only firm bit of ground in the Middle East left to our strategic planners. From the purely strategic point of view, to sacrifice this one remaining asset at a time when it is not even certain that we shall get any strategic rights or facilities in any part of Libya would seem inconsistent with policy of the firm hold on the Middle East which has been endorsed by the Prime Minister and Secretary of State, as well as by the Chiefs of Staff […] with Cyprus ceded to a Greece gone Communist, we should not only have created a vacuum in the Middle East, we should have gone halfway towards letting the Russians fill it.[8]

Another official wrote:

In more normal circumstances, the early cession of Cyprus to Greece might well be a wise policy, justified by considerations not only of justice, but also of expediency. But present circumstances are not normal.[9]

This smacked of sophistry, considering that Truman aid was already the order of the day, and that the civil war in Greece had been decided in favour of anti-leftism by 1949. The story of how Britain refused to give up Cyprus is well known enough not to have to repeat here. It is however worth mentioning that as early as 1952, the British government was advocating the idea of transferring its Middle East Headquarters from Egypt to Cyprus. A Top Secret letter to the Governor explains:

[…] the Commanders-in-Chief consider it to be very advisable that a reconnaissance should be undertaken without delay, with a view to the location in CYPRUS of General Headquarters, Middle East Land Forces and Headquarters, Middle East Air Force, together with elements of the Staff of the Senior British Naval Officer Middle East and of the British Middle East Office.[10]

In July 1954, the British government considered Cyprus so important to Britain that a Cabinet paper concluded:

We must, therefore, act on the assumption that deterioration in our relations with Greece is the price we must pay if we are to keep Cyprus. A point may even come at which we should have to decide whether Cyprus is strategically more important to us than Greece.[11]

Britain now began to plan its strategy for hanging onto Cyprus in one form or another. Even before EOKA began its campaign on 1 April 1955, Britain was helping Turkey over Cyprus: in February, 1955, the British Ambassador to Turkey wrote to the Foreign Office:

First, Turkish representatives abroad, particularly in London and Washington, might be more active in their publicity about the Turkish attitude to Cyprus; In the United Kingdom, their efforts might be directed (in this order) to: a) Members of Parliament, b) the weekly press (they have already been helped by the journalists’ visit last year) […] Turkish propaganda should however be presented with tact. For example, the Turkish Press Attaché in London has done no good by distributing leaflets of the ‘Cyprus is Turkish’ Association […] the Turks will no doubt be glad to know in due course what policy H.M.G. propose to follow between now and the next meeting of the United Nations General Assembly and Turkish policy is likely to be influenced by British views.[12]

The Foreign Office, displeased with the Greek-led internationalisation of the question,[13] and to keep the issue out of the United Nations, was to plan a tripartite conference on Cyprus that, behind the scenes, was really a dual conference, since Britain and Turkey closely coordinated their policies, the idea being to divide Cyprus in one way or another, as the Permanent Under Secretary of the Foreign Office made abundantly clear:

I have always been attracted by the idea of a 3-power conference, simply because I believe that it would seriously embarrass the Greek Government. And if such a conference were held, I should not produce any British plan or proposal until a Greek-Turkish deadlock has been defined […] And I repeat: I shall not produce any British plan until a Greek-Turkish difference has been exposed.[14]

At around the same time, a senior Foreign Office official wrote to the ambassador in Ankara:

The Turkish Government would be given advance warning of this statement, with an explanation of our motives, notably to deprive the Greek Government of a pretext for further reference of the Cyprus question to the United Nations, or alternatively to ensure their defeat if they did raise it.[15]

British collusion with Turkey was palpable, with the Prime Minister himself involved:

Dear Tony,

On Ankara telegram 479, the Prime Minister has minuted: Foreign Secretary – Turks are behaving well. If we keep friendly with them, the Greeks will have to come along in the end. Therefore we must not be parted from Turks, though we need not be ostentatious about this. – A.E. [Anthony Eden].[16]

The US government was by now well aware of Britain’s co-operation with Turkey, with the Secretary of State writing that ‘it was obvious that UK and Turks had consulted before informing Greeks.’[17]. Three weeks before the fateful conference, the American ambassador in London wrote:

Since British undoubtedly know what position Turkey will take at Conference their tactics are obviously to force Greece to define its attitude.[18]

Perhaps rather predictably, given this backstage diplomatic chicanery, the Foreign Office briefing for the conference stated:

The Turkish Government […] are opposed to any change in the sovereignty of Cyprus, and consider that if the British Government were [sic] ever relinquished the island should revert to Turkey […] consequently the British delegation proposes that the conference should record that it is unable to agree upon the problem of the future international status of Cyprus, including the question of self-determination.[19]

The most succinct conclusion to this slightly tawdry tale comes from a Greek diplomat, Themistocles Chrysanthopoulos, serving at his embassy in Washington at the time of these machinations:

The Cyprus question began in 1955. In the summer of that year the British Government convened a conference in London with Greece and Turkey on the subject of Defence of the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus. It was the first time Turkey was brought into the Cyprus affair [since the Treaty of Lausanne), contrary to article 16 of the Lausanne Peace Treaty in 1923, by which Turkey waived all rights in territories ceded to other countries, including, of course, Cyprus. To the Greek objection to involving Turkey in Cyprus the British side replied that Turkey was being invited as a witness. During the conference, Turkey demanded that, were the United Kingdom to withdraw from Cyprus, the island should of course be returned to its former owner (Turkey). This claim, of course, blew up the conference. The terrible riots in Istanbul and Izmir followed on 6 September, as ‘proof’ of the interest of the Turkish people in Cyprus. Consequences: 1) The end of Greek Turkish friendship dating from 1930. 2) Turkey became an active party in the Cyprus question.[20]

From then on, the die was cast: whatever solution was found, it would have to be one that satisfied the strategic interests of the British and Americans. What then, of the US stance?

The US Enters

One of the reasons for American involvement[21] in Cyprus – obviously unofficial, since the US had no legal locus standi – was that Britain had almost literally handed Greece to the US in 1947, thus bringing her into the Balkans and, by extension, Cyprus. Although just after the war, the US, like the USSR, had favoured decolonisation for her own reasons, Cyprus’ geographical position was to mean that the island would be forced to buck the trend. For President Truman was a rumbustious anti-communist to the extent that he distrusted Soviet motives, even though Britain had agreed with the USSR that she (Britain) would take the lead in Greece.

Although the US had been somewhat ambivalent about Cyprus, Britain still had the emotional clout of the ‘special relationship’, and, following the predictable failure of the conference and the anti-Greek pogrom in Istanbul and Izmir, the British Foreign Secretary, Macmillan, wrote an emotional letter to Dulles, ending with the words:

For all these reasons I must ask you to use your great influence against the inscription of this item [onto the agenda of the UN General Assembly]. The present indications are that the vote will be a close one and that the attitude of the United States will probably be decisive. Acting in harmony we could, I believe, prevent further discussion of this vexed problem in an atmosphere which is full of explosive possibilities.[22]

The Americans were by now worried at the problems for NATO, given the tension between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus, allied to Britain’s uncompromising stance. The Cold War was in full swing, and clearly any dissension among NATO partners Greece and Turkey would benefit the Soviet Union. Thus serious American pressure became inevitable. First, however, they succumbed to Macmillan’s plea to keep Cyprus off the UN agenda. The Greek Counsellor in Washington recalled how the South American countries, having assured Greece that they would vote in favour of the inclusion of Cyprus on the UN General Assembly’s agenda, then telephoned the Greek Embassy to inform it that they would now be voting against inclusion, without explanation.[23]

The following year, 1956, saw serious American involvement. Extracts from a State Department paper set the tone:

To strengthen the Allied position in the area and to free the British forces now tied down in Cyprus for general defense operations in the Middle East.[24] […] To end the Cyprus controversy as a divisive element affecting both NATO and the Balkan Alliance. […] The entire settlement to be guaranteed by the NATO countries.[25]

The paper included a plebiscite ten years later, under NATO supervision, permitting union with Greece, with Britain holding on to some territory in perpetuity. Events were of course to preclude the former possibility.

As the EOKA campaign continued, the Americans became increasingly worried, and critical of the British stance, as the British recognised, when an IRD[26] official wrote that the Americans disliked the fact that Britain was having to use force in Cyprus.[27] The forced exile of Archbishop Makarios to the Seychelles in March 1956 worried the Americans sufficiently to exert pressure on Britain to free him. President Eisenhower told the Prime Minister, Macmillan, that Makarios should be freed.[28] Coming in the wake of the Suez debâcle which put the seal on American control of the Eastern Mediterranean, Britain succumbed, and freed Makarios in April 1957, but forbade him from returning to Cyprus. In an interesting aside to the story of exile, the British had actually considered putting him on trial: in August 1956, the Governor, Harding, had written in a Top Secret telegram:

I am advised that the disclosures made in Grivas’ diaries could render person named liable to prosecution on various charges under the Criminal Code […] however it is most unlikely that the evidence at present available would be strong enough for us to be confident of obtaining a conviction […]The general effect we want to produce is that we have a cast-iron case against him but that we are not proceeding with it because, in the wider interests of promoting a lasting settlement, we consider it expedient to treat him with magnanimity he does not deserve.[29]

The Fateful Bomb

In the meantime, the tension continued, with increasing external interference from Ankara and Athens. The creation of a British auxiliary police force, consisting virtually exclusively of Turkish Cypriots, helped to sow divisions. Both EOKA on the Greek Cypriot side, and Volkan and the TMT (Turkish Defence Force) on the Turkish Cypriot side, actually killed those considered to be too moderate. Cyprus was already becoming an extremists’ paradise. Like the EOKA, Turkish nationalists were also in full swing, the result of British policy to collude with Turkey behind the scenes, and the creation of a Turkish Cypriot, as opposed to a mere Cypriot, identity. Britain’s policy of dividing the communities was coming to fruition in extremist acts of violence by both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, the aim being to further sow future divisions, whatever settlement was to be found. A prime example was action by Turkish extremists in a false flag operation. Although the story has been aired for several years, and was even admitted by Denktash on television, the British documents were only unearthed recently[30], and show that the British were fully aware of Turkish extremist actions, but somewhat reticent about it. Thus the story can now be irrevocably confirmed for historians.

On 9 September 1957, while the EOKAcampaign against the British was in full swing, a British Intelligence report stated:

1.   A fairly reliable source has said that the Turkish house at OMORFITA where the explosion took place on 31^st August 1957 has been used as a bomb making factory for some time. Twelve persons worked there in shifts and “thousands of bombs” have been made and distributed to various parts of the island.

                                                                            (C.6)

1.   On the night of the explosion there were several packing cases full of bombs in the house. When the bomb exploded the bulk of the completed bombs were removed by those who were uninjured and by neighbouring Turks.

(C.6)

1.   There are several other houses in NICOSIA where Turks are manufacturing bombs.

(C.3)     

1.   Since the explosion, VOLKAN has instructed the members to find suitable places outside the towns and villages for the manufacture of bombs.

(C.3)

SPECIAL BRANCH REPORT

[Here, the weeders have blanked out a paragraph]

The information at para 1 above appears likely to be highly exaggerated in so far as number of bombs is concerned. Information at para 2 is somewhat unlikely in view of prompt arrival of expatriate personnel at the scene.[31]

On 4 June 1958, at 18.30, the governor wrote to the Secretary of State for the Colonies:

Turkish hooligans have been increasingly active over the past week or two and on Saturday last they organised demonstrations during which demonstrators tore down English signs. This, following on the TMT murders of Left Wing Turks and the increase of TMT leaflets in the most violent terms, seems to show that the Turks are prepared for further violence and this may occur before the statement of policy is made in Parliament.[32]

The Governor was right: on 8 June, at 2.30 a.m., the following report was submitted to him:

SITUATION REPORT

There has been considerable rioting and arson tonight in Nicosia. It looked very much as though it was prearranged by Turks, particularly in view of the information we received a few days ago that they were planning just such a resort to riot and arson. Following is situation report at 2.00 a.m. Cyprus time.

2. At 22.00 hrs. bomb exploded on veranda of Turkish Press Counsellor. Very slight damage. Nothing more happened until midnight when Turkish youths began collecting in Kyrenia Gate area and in roads outside walls. They set fire to two cars and began stoning others. Youths observed carrying jerry cans. At about 0.100 [sic] hrs. fires started in Famagusta Gate area. Report, not yet confirmed, that six fires in all started one serious (timber yard) and all in Greek property. Police and Army fire brigades now at work on the fires and have them under control. Curfew imposed and is gradually taking effect. Mason-Dixon line manned with troops. Meanwhile Greeks had started ringing church bells and groups of Greek youths observed taking up positions in the town. Some fighting in Famagusta Gate area between groups of youths of both communities. Some casualties removed to hospital including two dead both Greek. Crowds being broken up and dispersed and for the time being situation appears to be under control. No report of Security Forces having to open fire.

3. Denktash and Turkish Consul-General were absent this evening at Larnaca addressing an unenthusiastic Turkish Youth Club meeting. Denktash returned after midnight and contacted by District Commissioner. He seemed genuinely upset and remarked “we (the Turks) have asked for it this time”. He gave the impression that he had no doubt that the trouble had been started deliberately by Turkish mischief-makers. This confirms our own impression that the bomb was probably planted by Turks themselves. Denktash addressed a crowd outside the Nicosia Divisional Police headquarters and persuaded them to disperse.

4. No incidents reported from other districts.

5. Present intention is to maintain curfew in Nicosia throughout tomorrow.

6. There have reports in local Turkish press of a mass meeting in Istanbul tomorrow. It seems possible that the trouble here may have been staged with that in view.[33]

At 4.45 a.m. on the same day, the Governor saw fit to send an emergency telegram, summarising the above, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, copied not only to the embassies in Athens and Ankara, and the Consulate General in Istanbul, but to the embassy in Washington:

Arson and rioting by the Turks started at about midnight in Nicosia tonight. Turks started a number of fires in Greek premises in the town, one a serious one, but all have now been brought under control. Some clashes between Turks and Greeks. Greeks in Nicosia and some neighbouring villages range [sic] church bells and excited crowds of Greeks gathered. Known casualties two Greek-Cypriot dead and a number wounded. Earlier in the evening a bomb had gone off at house of Turkish Press Counsellor doing no damage. There was no one [sic] inside at the time. Situation continues tense but under control. Curfew being enforced in Nicosia and troops have manned line between Turkish and Greek quarters. No trouble in any other part of the island.[34]

Only a quarter of an hour later, at 5.00 a.m., he sent another emergency telegram referring to the previous one:

My unnumbered telegram immediately preceding.

Incidents in Nicosia

Our assessment on the reports so far available is that there is no doubt that the arson and rioting were carried out by Turks in accordance with prearranged plan. In my telegram no. 727 [not found, unless the Governor means no. 724, above] I reported information which had reached us that the Turks were preparing to make trouble over this weekend. It seems clear that what has happened is in pursuit of this intention.

2. All the evidence at present available regarding the bomb incident at the Turkish Press Counsellor’s house suggests that this was staged by Turks as a pretext for the subsequent arson and rioting. It is most unlikely that Greeks would deliberately precipitate trouble at this juncture by an attack on Turkish Government premises. The explosive in the bomb was of a kind which had been used in the past in bombs found in the possession of Turks but we have no record of this material being used by Greeks. The placing of the bomb suggests that it was not intended to do any real damage. There is also the fact that no-one was inside at the time. The Press Counsellor had gone with the Turkish Consul-General and Denktash to attend a Turkish Youth meeting in Larnaca and this must have been known to Turks in Nicosia.

3. In short, all the circumstances point to a deliberately staged attempt by Turks to precipitate trouble. It might have been timed as a curtain-raiser to the mass meetings planned for to-morrow (Sunday) in Turkey on the occasion of “Cyprus Day”. It was preceded by an inflammatory broadcast from Ankara Radio earlier in the evening. Unlike previous Turkish riots it has none of the appearance of a spontaneous reaction to some act of violence by the Greeks.

4. I fear this could be the beginning of communal strife of a more serious kind than any we have seen since it indicates that Turks are prepared to carry out attacks on Greek property in order to serve their political ends. On this occasion, however, it may be that having made their demonstration they will wait a while before making a new move. On the other hand the Greeks may resort to counter-violence.

5. I saw leaders of the Turkish community in Nicosia early this morning and spoke very frankly to them about the dangers of such deliberate provocation of communal disorder by the Turks and their duty to give their community a clear lead against this.

6.The curfew in the walled city of Nicosia will be kept on throughout tomorrow (Sunday). It will apply to both Greeks and Turks. Road blocks will also be used to prevent people flocking into Nicosia from the surrounding villages.[35]

A little over eight hours later, at 13.45 (he must have needed some sleep), the Governor telegrammed the Colonial Office, reporting on his meeting with Turkish leaders. He, or whoever typed his telegram (in cypher) must have been rather sleepy or lacking in cool, since it was dated 8 July 1958, rather than June:

       Turkish Riots

       In my telegram no. 744 I reported that I had seen Nicosia Turkish leaders this morning. The meeting took place at 5.30 am. at Government House immediately after I had returned from seeing the damage caused by fire in the old city of Nicosia.

2. The four Turkish leaders whom I summoned were Denktash, Osman Orek, (an influential lawyer who is Vice Chairman of Evcaf High Council and Chairman of the Nicosia branch of the Cyprus-is-Turkish Party), Mr. Umit Suleiman (another lawyer who is head of the Turkish School Committee in Nicosia) and Dr. Gozmen (an ex-municipal councillor).

3. I told them that I had just come back from seeing the very serious damage carried by Turks in the city during the night. I said that I was sure that it had been planned by the Turks in advance. I said that we knew ahead that arson was intended and we knew that there was a danger that it would be carried out over this weekend. When we received this information action was taken at different levels to prevent it. The Administrative Secretary had seen Denktash, I had seen the Turkish Consul General, and our Ambassador in Ankara had seen the Turkish Secretary General. These approaches had all been undertaken to persuade the Turks to prevent the violence intended. I said that it was perfectly clear that the dreadful events of the night had not been in any way spontaneous but had been part of a deliberate plan and that those who had used inflammatory language must carry some of the responsibility (this was of course directed at Denktash). I said that it was unnecessary again to emphasise the terrible mistake of resorting to violence at this critical time and that I had called on the Turkish leaders in Nicosia to obtain their immediate and energetic co-operation in putting a stop to communal strife which would do infinite harm if it continued. I said that they had a clear negative and positive duty. They had a negative duty to refrain from incitement and a positive duty to restrain members of their community from any further violence.

4. The four Turkish leaders were obviously shaken by the events of the night. They did not attempt to deny to me that the bomb at the house of the Turkish Press Councillor [sic] had been put there by Turks (though they said that they could not admit this publicly). They said that excitement amongst unruly members of the Turkish community arose from the fact that no assurance could be given that the new declaration of policy would be acceptable to the Turks and that the Turkish community expected the new policy to be most unsatisfactory to them. They also said that those whom Denktash called the ‘Turkish teddyboys’ were out of control by the leaders. Denktash said that when the Administrative Secretary saw him on his return from Ankara on Friday last he made enquiries about the possibility of trouble over this weekend and understood that there was no intention that Turks would resort to violence at this time. He and the others said that they were unaware of any prior plan to carry out arson or any other form of violence last night. They agreed that the events of the night were deplorable and that everything could be done to prevent the trouble from continuing or spreading. I got the impression that they were really frightened by what had occurred and would do what they could to reduce tension.[36]

Now London acted: the same day (no time given), the Secretary of State (FO) telegrammed the ambassador in Ankara as follows:

Please seek an immediate interview with Turkish Prime Minister or Minister for Foreign Affairs and speak to him on following lines.

2. I have been gravely disturbed to hear of these incidents. I cannot believe that they would have taken place had the Turkish Government – as I have repeatedly requested them to do, most recently in my conversation with the Turkish Ambassador on June 3^rd – used their influence with the Turkish Cypriot community to urge the latter to exercise restraint. I am particularly concerned to see that these disturbances were preceded by an inflammatory broadcast by the Ankara radio.

3. Incidents such as these, though they will not deter H.M.G. from their efforts to find a solution of the Cyprus problem, are bound to render this task more difficult. I must therefore in the spirit of the friendship between Turkey and the U.K. formally ask the Turkish Government to exercise all their influence both with the Turkish community in Cyprus and with the Turkish Press and radio to refrain from violence and inflammatory propaganda. I most earnestly trust the Turkish Government will be prepared to take steps in this sense without delay.[37]

As the Governor and his staff considered matters, tensions remained high. On 10 June, the Governor telegrammed the Secretary of State, and the ambassadors in Ankara and Athens:

       Bomb Incident at Turkish Information Bureau

 As you will have seen from my telegram no. 768, I think it wiser not to make any official statement at this stage of the conclusions we so far have reached, as a result of the investigations into this incident, as to where the responsibility lies. But I wish to retain discretion to do this if I consider this to be necessary. And I have made this clear to the Turkish Cypriot leaders. Each side has, of course, attributed the blame to the other, and Kutchuk, in his speech at the public rally in Istanbul on Sunday, went so far as to say –

       “I want to tell you about a bloody incident which took place last night. We have a newly opened Information Office in Nicosia. The murderous gang, the priests’ hordes, the criminals, hurled a bomb into the Information premises, causing damage. On learning of this, members of the Turkish community collected together and marched into the Greek quarter, killing two Greeks and wounding five.”

2. There have also been reports in the Turkish Press that a Greek youth was actually seen throwing the bomb. From official sources there is absolutely no confirmation of this story.

3. If we are compelled, as a result of continuing inflammatory allegations by the Turks on this subject, to make any official statement, the following are points which might be included: –

• On any assessment of the security and political considerations involved, it seems unlikely that Greek Cypriot terrorists would have attacked Turkish Government property at this time and in this way.

• The timing and manner of the placing of the bomb suggest that it was intended to cause the minimum amount of damage and, in particular, to avoid injury or loss of life.

• Expert examination of the explosive charge and fragments indicates that they were of a different kind from any known to have been used in the past by Greek Cypriot terrorists, but were of a kind known to have been used recently in bombs of Turkish Cypriot manufacture.

4. It is also on record that when Denktash arrived at the scene of the incident, soon after it occurred, he said to the District Commissioner and the Assistant Commissioner of Police who were present: “Well, we’ve asked for it”. They asked him if he knew what sort of bomb it was, and he agreed that it was a Turkish bomb. The District Commissioner says that Denktash said: “Of course it is a Turkish bomb”. An expatriate Special Branch officer who was present says that Denktash used were: “We’ve asked for this. The Greeks would not dare to do it. We’ve gone too far this time. I can’t stop it”. After my meeting with the Turkish leaders yesterday, the Administrative Secretary took Denktash aside and reminded him, with reference to my remark that it would not be to their interest for Government to publish its conclusions about the incident, that he was on record as having made the remarks quoted above at the scene of the incident. Denktash did not attempt to deny this and, in fact, indicated that he personally had no doubt it was Turks who were responsible.

5. The information in the preceding paragraph must clearly be treated as strictly confidential unless and until we decide that Denktash must be put on the spot. I am reluctant to do this so long as there is any hope of his playing a useful role with the Turkish community. The disclosure at this time of his having accepted that the Turks were responsible for the incident might well place his life in danger.

6. I think, however, that there would be no objection to the Ambassador using, if he thinks fit, the other points set out in paragraph 3 above in conversation with Turkish ministers. In doing so, he would no doubt make the points that I was deliberately refraining from publishing anything in order not to make matters worse, that I might, however, be compelled to do so if inflammatory allegations continue about Greeks having set the bomb, and that would clearly not be to the advantage of the Turkish case for me to do so.[38]

Clearly, the night of 7 to 8 June 1958 was a sleepless one for the Governor and his staff, reflected in some small discrepancies in the above telegrams. First, the Governor sent a telegram (no.744) at 5 am, stating that he had met leaders of the Turkish community early that morning, obviously in the small hours before he sent the telegram. Yet telegram no. 751, sent at 1.45 pm, stated that he had met them at 5.30, and therefore apparently after he had sent a telegram stating that he had met them. More amusing about the telegram is that it was dated 8 July, rather than June. Such are the vagaries of moments of extreme crisis.

As regards the curfew mentioned in the Governor’s telegram 744, the fact that he said that it would apply both to Greeks and Turks is bizarre. He could hardly have applied a curfew on only one of the two main communities.

Most significant is the final telegram quoted, which makes it quite clear that the British were loth to embarrass Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. Britain was of course not impartial in its attitude towards the two main communities on Cyprus.

Britain was in fact tutoring Turkey in how to promote its point of view, namely partition, but had to appear even-handed to the outside world, especially since British fair play was important, at least presentationally. Despite British attempts to calm things down and get Turkey to control the extremist Turkish Cypriots, the opposite proved to be the case, and the riots continued, with over one hundred killed, including eight Greek Cypriots out of a group of thirty five dumped by the British near a Turkish Cypriot village when discovered crouching in a riverbed armed with sticks and stones.[39] Many Greek Cypriots were forced out of their homes in Nicosia. The Governor, Hugh Foot, was to write later:

Zorlu, the Foreign Minister of Turkey, was the most ruthless of them and was, I think, the rudest man I ever met […] He had, I have no doubt, known of and perhaps given the orders for the Turkish riots and the attempt to burn Nicosia.[40]

Although the Governor knew of Turkish responsibility for the bomb, he does not mention this in his memoirs, presumably because he was not allowed to release secret and top secret information. This is a shame, since it gives a warped and incomplete picture.

It is fairly well known that truth is the first casualty of war, although it does often emerge years later. Whenever one dares to speculate, one is often branded a ‘conspiracy theorist’, as I would have been, had I speculated that the Turks planted a bomb against themselves, at least without the documentary evidence that I have now provided. One day, perhaps we shall be provided with incontrovertible evidence that it was indeed also Turks who planted a bomb at their own consulate-general in Thessaloniki, thus sparking the anti-Greek pogrom in Turkey of September 1955. And while on the subject of agents provocateurs, it is not certain that Greeks or Greek Cypriots murdered a British housewife in Famagusta in October 1958.[41] It could have been an American, a Turk, a Russian or even an Englishman. One hopes that one day incontrovertible evidence will appear.

This story, now fully established as factual, demonstrates par excellence how the British policy of bias and turning a blind eye to Turkish violence was to leave a lingering resentment on the part of Greek Cypriots, a dysfunctional state, and to more strife. Britain’s essential aim was to ensure its military bases and listening posts, as the US wished. The convoluted settlement was predicated on a NATO solution, with only limited sovereignty for the future Republic of Cyprus. Even David Hannay, the promoter of the Annan reunification plan, strongly rejected by the Cypriot voters, referred to the 1960 treaties setting up the Republic of Cyprus as ‘a potentially dysfunctional set of arrangements’.[42]  Henry Kissinger, too, shared the same view: ‘In 1959, Britain brokered an arrangement which was doomed from the start because it sought to address the essentially irreconcilable demands of all the parties by agreeing to all of them simultaneously.’[43]

Given the fact that the years 1955 to 1959 led to a ‘NATO solution’ for Cyprus, it is hardly surprising that Moscow looked askance at the whole dysfunctional arrangement.

The Soviet View

The Soviet press made a number of points, reported as follows by the British Embassy in Moscow:

The first substantive Soviet press comment on the Zurich talks appears in a press article by “Observer” entitled “Imperialists’ Compact” in today’s Pravda. The main points are

1. the imperialists view the national liberation movement in Cyprus primarily as a threat to the strategic position of the island as a spring-board for aggression in the Middle east;[44]
2. the United States became intensely anxious to eliminate Anglo-Greek Turkish differences in order
3. to preserve the position of N.A.T.O. in the Eastern Mediterranean;
4. to revive the Balkan Alliance;

• for the above reasons the United States brought decisive pressure to bear on Greece to come to terms with the United Kingdom and Turkey over Cyprus in order to achieve a speedy solution (Izvestia, of February 14, in a review of Greek press comment, quoted “Vima” as saying that the United States had exerted such pressure by threatening to cut off economic aid to Greece);

1. the proclamation of a republic in Cyprus will not materially affect the Cypriots since the United Kingdom is to retain the right to keep military bases there in perpetuity, and the island will remain shackled to N.A.T.O;
2. the decisions taken behind the backs of the Cypriot people ignore their just demands and represent a colonialist plot directed against Cypriot interests and against peace and international security;
3. the Greek Government has abandoned its former position and capitulated to United States pressure. The reason for this is that “certain circles” in Greece are seeking a way out of their internal difficulties and aim to distract attention from their persecution of progressive forces in their preparation of increasing anti-democratic terror;

• the Soviet public stands for the right of all peoples to decide their own future and condemns the Zurich “plot” as a threat to peace and a dagger in the back of heroic Cypriot patriots;
• in Greece, public hostility towards these new imperialist manoeuvres in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans is increasing.

2. Other articles in the Soviet press today and yesterday have supported this general line, mostly by using selected quotations from the Greek newspapers “Avgi”, “Vima” and “Eleftheria”.[45]

Soviet policy, then as now, was to prevent what it saw as unwarranted NATO influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Hence its emphasis on a Cyprus free of foreign military forces, and even demilitarised. Enosis was certainly not its priority, since that would have entailed the spread of NATO, de jure, to the island. The Kremlin had certainly heeded Henry Kissinger’s words in 1957: ‘But for the foreseeable future we should be able to count on Okinawa or perhaps the Philippines as a staging area for the Far East, on Cyprus or Libya as staging areas for the Middle East, and on Great Britain as a staging area for Europe.’[46] Moscow is fully aware of NATO’s keenness to spread its influence wherever it can, and is unlikely to countenance the possibility of official NATO forces near to Syria. As long as the two NATO members, Greece and Turkey threaten each other, Moscow is happy, while the US therefore pushes for a settlement for Cyprus that will prevent a state with an independent foreign policy, since it could one day move closer to Moscow. Even while the unoccupied part of Cyprus has its own foreign policy, there will always be a danger for NATO that it will move closer to Moscow, hence the Annan Plan.  Then becomes now.

Conclusions

Then, as now, Cyprus’s institutional existence, predicated on the military bases and, oxymoronically, on dysfunctional treaties, is subject to the NATO-Russia relationship. A new factor is of course EU membership, with Cyprus an embarrassment for Brussels. As the Cyprus problem rumbles on, Britain’s errors between at least 1955 and 1959 are still palpable, however much the effort on the part of some parties to sweep the past under the carpet and to paper over the cracks. The same errors are being repeated today, albeit in new semantic shapes. Let us begin to conclude with David Hannay’s views,[47] which betray how Cyprus is still used by the US and UK as a tool not only to maintain NATO power in the Eastern Mediterranean, but to encourage Turkish EU membership. Following the rejection of the above-mentioned Annan Plan, and thus of the Foundation Agreement that would have obliged Cyprus (as well as Britain and Greece) to support Turkey’s EU aspirations), Hannay described Presi­dent Papadopoulos’ television speech criticising the Annan Plan as lengthy, rambling and emotional, when in fact it was surprisingly precise and cogent. He displayed his inadequate knowledge of the Cyprus problem by omitting to mention the following in the eight-and-a-half-page ‘Historical Background’ section of his book: the Foreign Office’s rôle in dividing the Greek- and Turkish-speaking communities on Cyprus (particularly in 1955); Brit­ain’s secret collusion with Turkey; Britain’s key rôle in the 1963 debâcle (by helping Archbishop Makarios to draft his ‘Thirteen Points’); and British and US agreement in 1963 and 1964 not to resist militarily a putative Turkish invasion. He did at least admit that ‘we [the British] had indeed not covered ourselves with glory’,[48] but only as an apparent self-protective aside at the end of the book. Most revealingly, he gave the lie to the plan with his final words: ‘and it is difficult to see any solution straying far away from the Annan Plan which has been so widely endorsed. But if Tur­key’s candidature stalls or is blocked, it is not easy to be sanguine’. This apparent threat shows that one of the plan’s objectives was to use Cyprus as an instrument to help Turkey’s EU application. Thus, now as then, Cyprus is still seen by the US, Britain and Turkey as a piece of valuable military real estate, but also as an instrument.

As I end this piece about the years 1955 to 1959, and American, British and Russian interests around Cyprus, I see the same basic factors today: external tensions, fear of Russia, and a continuing attempt to solve a problem by repeating the same errors.

• William Mallinson

Primary Sources

British National Archives.

Foreign Relations of the United States.

Bibliography

Butterfield, Herbert and Wight, Martin (eds.), Diplomatic Investigations, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1966.

Faustman, Hubert: ‘The United Nations and the Internationalisation of the Cyprus Conflict 1949-1958’, in Ker-Lindsay, James, Richmond, Oliver (eds.): Promoting Peace and Development in Cyprus over four Decades, Macmillan, 2001.

Foot, Hugh, A Start in Freedom, Hodder and Stoughton Ltd., London, 1964.

Hannay, David, Cyprus: The Search for a Solution, I.B. Tauris, London and New York, 2005.

Hill, Christopher, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2003.

Holland, Robert, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959, OUP, 1998.

Kissinger, Henry, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper Brothers, New York, 1957.

Kissinger, Henry, Years of Renewal, Simon and Schuster UK Ltd., London, 2012.

Mallinson William, Cyprus a Modern History, I.B. Tauris, London and New York, 2005, 2009, 2010 and 2012. Republished by Bloomsbury, 2020.

Mallinson, William, Portrait of an Ambassador: the Life, Times and Writings of Themistocles Chrysanthopoulos, Athens, 1998.

O’Tuthail, Gearóid, in O’Tuthail, Gearóid, Dalby, Simon and Routledge, Paul (eds.), The Geopolitics Reader, Routledge, London and New York, 1998.

Taylor, A.J.P., The Origins of the Second World War, Penguin Books Ltd., London, 1964.

Wright, Peter, Spycatcher, Viking Penguin Inc., New York, 1987.

Yutang, Lin, The Importance of Living, Heinemann, London, 1976 (first published in 1938.

Newspapers

Phileleftheros, Nicosia, 4 and 5 May 2014.

Author’s Biography         

William Mallinson, Professor of Political Ideas and Institutions at Guglielmo Marconi University, a member of the editorial committee of the Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, and a member of Cambridge Scholars Publishing’s Editorial Advisory Group (history), is a former Member of Her Majesty’s Diplomatic Service who left to study for, and was awarded, his Ph.D. at the London School of Economics and Political Science’s Department of International History. He covered Dutch foreign policy, Dutch-German relations and German rearmament during the initial period of the building of European institutions and NATO, and the formative years of the Cold War. Following a period in business as European Public Affairs Manager at ITT’s European Headquarters in Brussels, and then Digital Equipment Corporation’s in Geneva, he turned his attention to the academic world, playing a pivotal role in introducing Britain’s first Honours degree in Public Relations. He was a CAM Examiner, and then Lecturer in British history, literature and culture at the Ionian University. Since 1994, when he was awarded a Greek Government scholarship, he has been perusing British Foreign Office, Ministry of Defence, Prime Minister’s Office and Cabinet archives, under the general rubric of Anglo-Greek relations during the Cold War, including Cyprus. He has also published several articles in the press, has been interviewed by the BBC World, Russia Today and Russia Channel One, and spoken at numerous conferences, in Moscow, London, Zurich, Athens, Rome and Cyprus. He has undertaken corporate consultancy projects, and is an occasional lecturer at the Greek National Defence School, particularly on Britain and Russia/USSR. He speaks, reads and writes French, German, Italian, and Dutch, and has a working knowledge of Greek. His books are:

Public Lies and Private Truths, Cassell, London and New York, 1996, and Leader Books, Athens, 2000.

Portrait of an Ambassador, Attica Tradition Educational Foundation, Athens, 1998.

Cyprus: A Modern History, I.B. Tauris, London and New York, 2005, updated in 2009, 2010 and 2012 as a paperback. Also published in Greek in 2005 by Papazissis, Athens. Published by Bloomsbury Academic since 2020.

From Neutrality to Commitment: Dutch Foreign Policy, NATO and European Integration, I.B. Tauris, London and New York, 2010. Published in paperback by Bloomsbury Academic since 2010.

Partition through Foreign Aggression, University of Minnesota, 2010.

Cyprus, Diplomatic History and the Clash of Theory in International Relations, I.B. Tauris, London and New York, 2010. Also published in Greek by Estia, 2010.

The Same Things Return with Different Colours, Aracne Editrice, Rome, 2013.

Britain and Cyprus: Key Themes and Documents since World War Two, I.B. Tauris, London and New York, 2011. Published by Bloomsbury Academic since 2020.

Behind the Words: The FCO, Hegemonolingualism, and the End of Britain’s Freedom, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle upon Tyne, 2014 and 2016 (paperback).

Kissinger and the Invasion of Cyprus: Diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle upon Tyne, 2016, 2017.

The Threat of Geopolitics to International Relations: Obsession with the Heartland, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle upon Tyne, 2016. Co-author Zoran Ristic.

Thrice a Stranger: Penelope’s Eastern Mediterranean Odyssey, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle upon Tyne, 2016. Also published in Greek by Epikentro, 2017, and in Italian, Aracne Editrice, Rome, 2019.

Images in Words: only History Exists, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle upon Tyne, 2018.

Guicciardini, Geopolitics and Geohistory: Understanding Inter-state Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, 2021.

He has numerous articles and reviews in academic refereed journals. of which some recent ones are:

‘US Interests, British Acquiescence and the Invasion of Cyprus’, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, vol.9, no. 3, August 2007.

‘Britain, Cyprus, Turkey, the USA and Greece in 1977: Critical Submission or Submissive Criticism?’, Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 44, no. 4, October 2009.

‘Spies, Jolly Hockeysticks and Imperialism in Cyprus’, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, vol. 13, issue 2, June 2011.

‘Foreign Policy Issues of a Part-Occupied EU State’, The Cyprus Review, vol.23,

no.1, Spring 2011.

‘Reviewing the Continuing Cyprus Conundrum’, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, vol.14, issue 4, December 2012.

‘Greece and Cyprus in Foreign Office Eyes: Then is Now’, ΕΠΕΤΗΡΙΔΑ, XXXVI, 2011-2012, Journal of the Centre of Scientific Research, Nicosia, 2013.

‘Greece and Cyprus as Geopolitical Fodder’, Etudes Hélleniques/Hellenic Studies, vol. 22, no. 2, Autumn 2014.

‘The Same Things Return with Different Colours’ (review article), Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, vol. 17, no. 2, June 2015.

‘Greece, Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean: Russia’s and the Anglo-Saxons’ Piggies-in-the Middle: Then is Now’, ΕΠΕΤΙΡΙΔΑ, XXXVII, Journal of the Centre for Scientific Research, Nicosia, 2015.

‘Kissinger’s Outlook: Fifty Shades of Diplomacy’, ΕΠΕΤΙΡΙΔΑ, XXXVIII, Journal of the Centre for Scientific Research, Nicosia, 2016.

‘Kissinger and the Business of Government: the Invasion of Cyprus, 15 July- 20 August 1974’, The Cyprus Review, Vol. 29, 2017. Co-author Vassilis Fouskas.

Review of A Pacifist’s Life and Death: Grigorios Lambrakis and Greece in the long Shadow of Civil War, by Evi Gotzaridis, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle upon Tyne, 2016, in Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, vol. 20, issue 6, December 2018.

‘Greece and Cyprus as Geopolitical Fodder, and the Russian Connexion’, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 9 March 2020.

Review article: The Complete Maisky Diaries: Volume 1: The Rise of Hitler and the Gathering Clouds of War 1932–1938; Volume 2: The Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and the Battle of Britain 1939–1940; Volume 3: The German Invasion of Russia and the Forging of the Grand Alliance 1941–1943, edited by Gabriel Gorodetsky, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 29 March 2020.

‘Then Is Now, but the Colours are New: Greece, Cyprus and the Evolving Power Game between the West, Russia and Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean’, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 1 April.  Co-authors: Pavel Kanevskiy & Aris Petasis, 1 April 2020.

[1] Taylor, A.J.P., The Origins of the Second World War, Penguin Books Ltd., London, 1964, pp. 8-9.

[2] Sir Edmond Lyons, British Minister to Greece, 1841.

[3] Yutang, Lin, The Importance of Living, Heinemann, London, 1976 (first published in 1938), pp. 9 and 404.

[4] Here, I am not of course referring to the sensible English School of the sixties, and the likes of Hedley Bull and Martin Wight. See Diplomatic Investigations, Butterfield, Herbert and Wight, Martin (eds.), George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1966.

[5] Hill, Christopher, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2003 p. 168.

[6] O’Tuthail, Gearóid, in O’Tuthail, Gearóid, Dalby, Simon and Routledge, Paul (eds.), The Geopolitics Reader, Routledge, London and New York, 1998, p. 1.

[7] Ibid., p. 169.

[8] Johnston to colleagues, 24 October 1947, memorandum, NA/FO 371/67084, file R 13462/G.

[9] Ibid.,Wallinger, 24 October 1947, memo on file jacket.

[10] Ewbank (Secretary, British Defence Co-ordination Committee, MIDDLE EAST) to Governor, Cyprus, letter, 7 March 1952, BNA FCO 4141, file MIL/1248/ME.

[11] BNA/CAB 129/69, July 1954.

[12] Bowker to Young, 15 February 1955, letter, BNA/FO 371/117625, file RG 1081/120.

[14] Kirkpatrick to Nutting, 26 June 1955, memorandum, BNA/FO 371/17640, file 1081/535.

[15] Ward to Bowker, 25 June 1955, memorandum, BNA/ FO371/117642, file RG 1081/502.

[16] Prime Minister’s Private Secretary to Rumbold, 17 July 1955, letter, BNA FO 371/117644, file RG 1081/692, in Mallinson William, Cyprus a Modern History, I.B. Tauris, London and New York, 2005, 2009, 2010 and 2012, p.25.

[17] Dulles (at US Embassy in France) to Department of State, 16 July 1955, telegram, FRUS 1955-1957, vol. XXXIV, p. 274.

[18] Ibid., Butterworth to State Department, 10 August 1955, telegram, p. 277.

[19] Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 3 September 1955, memorandum c.p. 955 117, BNA/CAB 129/77.

[20] Mallinson, William, Portrait of an Ambassador: the Life, Times and Writings of Themistocles Chrysanthopoulos, Athens, 1998, pp. 26-27.

[21] Op. cit., Faustman.

[22] Op. cit., FRUS, Macmillan to Dulles, message, 19 September 1955, p. 297.

[23] Op. cit., Portrait of an Ambassador, p. 28.

[24] According to Wright, Peter, Spycatcher, Viking Penguin Inc., New York, 1987, p. 154, by 1956, 40,000 British troops were pinned down by a few hundred of Grievas’ guerrillas.

[25] Op. cit., FRUS, Goals in the Cyprus Dispute, undated (covering letter 13 August 1956), pp. 385-387.

[26] Information Research Department, set up in the Foreign Office in 1947, to prepare anti-Soviet propaganda. Allegedly wound up in 1977 by David Owen, but probably continues in new colours.

[27] Peck to Stewart, 28 May 1956, letter, BNA/FO 953/1693, file PG 11926/8.

[28] Op. cit., FRUS, p. 466, editorial note reproducing extract from President Eisenhower’s diary, at the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

[29] Harding, 29 August 1965, telegram 1755, BNA/FCO 141/4353.

[30] See my two articles in Phileleftheros of 4 and 5 May 2014. I discovered the documents in early 2014.

[31] BNA/FCO 141/3840, ‘PHANTOM Secret’ report by SECURITY INTELLIGENCE on “VOLKAN” ACTIVITIES, 9 September 1957.

[32] BNA/FCO 141/3848, Governor to Secretary of State, 4 June 1958, telegram no. 724.

[33] Ibid., SITUATION REPORT, 8 June 1958, 02.30 hours.

[34] Ibid., 8 June 1958, unnumbered telegram.

[35] Ibid., 8 June 1958, telegram no. 744.

[36] Ibid., Governor to Colonial Office, repeated to Ankara and Athens, 8 July [sic] 1958, telegram no. 751.

[37] Ibid., Secretary of State (Foreign Office) to Ankara, 8 June 1958, telegram no. 1399.

[38] Ibid., Governor to Secretary of State, 10 June 1958, telegram no. 774.

[39] Ibid., Mallinson, p. 32.

[40] Foot, Hugh, A Start in Freedom, Hodder and Stoughton Ltd., London, 1964, p. 150.

[41] See Holland, Robert, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959, OUP, 1998, p. 287.

[42] Hannay, David, Cyprus: The Search for a Solution, I.B. Tauris, London and New York, 2005, p.4.

[43] Kissinger, Henry, Years of Renewal, Simon and Schuster UK Ltd., London, 2012, pp. 196-197.

[44] If the Soviet press was referring to EOKA, this is slightly bizarre, since Grivas was a rabid anti-Communist.

[45] British Embassy, Moscow to Foreign Office, 17 February 1959, telegram, BNA FO371/144616, file no. RGC 10338/2.

[46] Kissinger, Henry, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper Brothers, New York, 1957, p. 165.

[47] Op. cit., Hannay, pp. 1-9.

[48] Ibid., p. 239.