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How Algeria’s Rupture with the UAE Could Roil the Region

Algiers has severed diplomatic ties with Abu Dhabi, following years of discord over crises in North Africa and the Sahel.

The two countries see their dispute very differently, but it has nonetheless become a rivalry that could put regional stability at risk.

On 10 September, Algeria broke off diplomatic relations with the United Arab Emirates, in the latest manifestation of a confrontation between the two countries over policy in the Middle East, North Africa and the Sahel.

Since 2020, disagreements have festered between Algiers and Abu Dhabi over Israel, Morocco and Western Sahara. Algeria has also grown increasingly suspicious of the aims of Emirati involvement in crises in Libya, Sudan and Sahelian states.

The rupture is marked by an asymmetry of perceptions. Algiers sees the UAE, sitting far away in the Gulf, as interfering in its North African and Sahelian neighbourhood, where it is looking to rebuild the diplomatic clout that it wielded for decades after winning independence from French colonial rule in 1962. It views Emirati interventions as, at the very least, encroachments upon its historical domain. Abu Dhabi, for its part, says economic ties, not Algeria, are central to its African engagement. It forswears any intent to provoke or sideline Algiers.

The bilateral discord has become a full-blown rivalry, however, and one that is becoming perilous as regional security arrangements are changing. Algeria is forging closer links with Niger, as well as with Chad. It is also backing the Sudanese army in its war with the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and Libya’s internationally recognised government in Tripoli in its power struggle with Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, whose forces control the country’s east. Algerian officials describe these moves as reinforcing the country’s “strategic borders”. Algeria remains bitterly at odds with Morocco over Western Sahara and other issues, and it is just now repairing relations with Mali. Meanwhile, the UAE is forming its own partnerships in North Africa and the Sahel, which can involve both states and armed groups, and which often (though not always) put it indirectly in competition with Algeria.

A direct clash between the two countries is unlikely. Their respective alliance systems overlap somewhat and do not constitute coherent groups of adversaries. Still, jostling among them could draw in Algeria, the UAE or both, with the risk of local escalation or inadvertent confrontation.

Roots of the Break-up

Dramatic as the 10 September rupture was, it had been a long time coming.

Until 2020, relations between Algeria and the UAE were strong. In the early 1970s, Algeria sent oil experts, including executives from Sonatrach, Algeria’s state-owned hydrocarbons company, to the Gulf to help establish the institutions that would become the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company. Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who served as Algeria’s president between 1999 and 2019, lived in Abu Dhabi from 1984 to 1987, working as a diplomatic adviser to Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, father of today’s leader Mohammed bin Zayed (aka MBZ). During Bouteflika’s tenure as Algerian head of state, Emirati capital made significant inroads into the Algerian economy, including in the defence sector. In 2012, for example, Emirati investors cooperated with the Algerian defence ministry and state-owned companies in joint ventures to produce Mercedes-Benz vehicles and Emirati-designed NIMR armoured vehicles in Algeria. The UAE built networks of contacts within the Algerian political, business and military elite, some of which survived Bouteflika’s fall in 2019.

The UAE’s 2020 normalisation with Israel – part of what is known as the Abraham Accords – opened a first crack in the relationship. Algiers firmly opposed any Arab state forging ties with Israel before a comprehensive settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In September 2020, President Abdelmadjid Tebboune criticised what he described as a “rush” (empressement) toward normalisation, declaring that Algeria would not be part of it.

Algiers has long been the foremost outside backer of the Polisario Front, the group battling for an independent Western Sahara.

Algerian concerns grew further when, on 4 November 2020, the UAE became the first Arab country to open a consulate in Western Sahara, establishing a diplomatic office in Laayoune, a city in the Moroccan-controlled part of the disputed territory. Algiers has long been the foremost outside backer of the Polisario Front, the group battling for an independent Western Sahara. Sabri Boukadoum, then Algeria’s foreign minister, questioned the move’s compatibility with international law and reaffirmed Algerian support for Sahrawi self-determination. A month later, Morocco followed the UAE in normalising relations with Israel, prompting Algerian authorities to discern an emerging UAE-Morocco-Israel alliance in their immediate vicinity.

This perception was significantly reinforced in November 2021, when Morocco and Israel signed a landmark defence cooperation agreement. The agreement formalised defence ties and paved the way for cooperation in areas including intelligence and military training. Algerian authorities viewed this deepening partnership as tantamount to a direct threat, part of a regional alignment aimed at weakening their country.

Algerian worries extended to allegations of foreign interference in domestic affairs. Officials accused Morocco and Israel of supporting the Movement for the Self-Determination of Kabylia (MAK), an independence movement that Algeria designated a terrorist organisation in 2021. As evidence, they pointed to the fact that Morocco’s representative at the UN had publicly argued that the Kabyle people are entitled to exercise a right to self-determination. A number of former Algerian diplomats and commentators implicated the UAE in these purported destabilisation efforts as well: a Morocco-based think-tank separately reported on contacts between MAK representatives and Emirati figures, citing sources within the Kabyle independence movement, among others.

The Dispute Deepens

Other regional disagreements added to the tensions. In 2020 and again in 2022, Abu Dhabi opposed the appointment of successive Algerian foreign ministers as UN envoys to Libya, against the backdrop of Emirati support for Field Marshal Haftar, and Algeria’s closer links with the authorities in Tripoli. The UAE cited the objections of Arab states and Libyan actors, expressing their concern that Algeria, as a neighbouring country deeply involved in the conflict, could not be viewed as an impartial mediator. Another friction point surfaced in 2023, when Algerian government-aligned media attributed the failure of Algeria’s BRICS application to Emirati manoeuvring against its candidacy.

Views in Algiers on how to counter the UAE’s gambits – real and perceived – may not have been entirely aligned. Some elements of the security establishment and associated media favoured a confrontational approach, while others, including figures close to former army Chief of Staff Ahmed Gaïd Salah, worried about jeopardising significant economic interests and longstanding personal connections. The exact boundaries of these contrasting viewpoints, however, remained unclear. As Emirati actions increasingly clashed with Algeria’s regional priorities and came to be perceived as national security threats, displaying restraint became more difficult.

Despite his initial reticence to comment on the matter, President Tebboune’s criticism of the UAE gradually became louder.

Despite his initial reticence to comment on the matter, President Tebboune’s criticism of the UAE gradually became louder. In 2024, he complained that wherever conflict erupted in the region, the money of an unnamed Gulf state could be found behind it; in 2025, he said Algeria enjoyed good relations with all Gulf monarchies, except one. By the following February, he was openly denouncing a “mini-state” that was destabilising the Arab world and the Sahel.

Successive attempts to ease tensions made little headway. Former Algerian diplomats told Crisis Group that Gulf states, including Bahrain and Oman, sent emissaries to Algiers to try mediating between the two sides. They said Algeria rejected these efforts, however, and will keep doing so as long as what it regards as Emirati meddling continues. Direct contacts endured, but they failed to achieve a thaw. By February, when Algeria terminated the 2013 bilateral agreement that provided the legal framework for air travel between the two countries, the room for compromise had considerably narrowed.

Rivalry in the Sahel

As relations deteriorated, the dispute increasingly spilled into a contest for influence in North Africa and the Sahel. A May 2024 tour of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso by UAE Minister of State Sheikh Shakhboot bin Nahyan Al Nahyan raised hackles in Algeria, which has long described Mali in particular as a “brother” nation. Abu Dhabi was offering the Sahelian capitals cooperation on counter-terrorism just as Western influence was waning in the region and the new Alliance of Sahel States (AES) was opening it to new external patrons. There were other angles as well: for the UAE, security cooperation is inseparable from economic interests, particularly when it comes to natural resources; Dubai’s role in the international gold trade, including gold originating in the Sahel, gave the UAE an additional stake in regional developments. Meanwhile, Algeria’s historical ties with Bamako and the other AES capitals were reaching a nadir.

Emirati officials maintain that its engagement was not aimed at supplanting Algeria. Indeed, they rarely present Algiers as a competitor when discussing the Sahel or any other African region. Rather, they say, Abu Dhabi is pursuing a broad strategy, rooted in geo-economics, designed to expand the UAE’s footprint on a continent that has gained in importance. As an Emirati businessman and former government official told Crisis Group in explaining the scope of Abu Dhabi’s ambition, “You’re either at the table or on the menu”.

Algerian officials, by contrast, view the UAE’s combination of investments and partnerships with governments, business elites and armed actors as a means of undermining their country’s interests. They regard the Sahel as crucial to Algerian security, particularly since Bamako abandoned the Algeria-mediated 2015 peace agreement with armed separatists in northern Mali, whom they fear could make common cause with co-ethnics on the Algerian side of the border. Algerian concerns were heightened by allegations of ransom payments, mentioned in an August UN report and linked to the UAE by regional sources, to the jihadist group JNIM that has grabbed chunks of Malian and other Sahelian state territory. Algiers has long argued that such payments strengthen armed groups active near its frontiers.

The contrast in approach and threat perceptions became particularly acute over events in Niger. Following a 2023 coup there, relations between Algiers and Niamey soured, and they worsened further in April 2025, when Niger recalled its ambassador from Algiers in solidarity with authorities in Bamako, with whom Algiers was then at loggerheads over the abrogated peace agreement and other issues. Bilateral ties subsequently improved, following Nigerien leader General Abdourahamane Tiani’s visit to Algiers the following February. The two countries revived their security cooperation, and Niger even helped broker the present rapprochement between Algeria and Mali.

Relations with Niger … have an important economic dimension for both Algeria and the UAE.

Relations with Niger also have an important economic dimension for both Algeria and the UAE. Algeria considers Niger key to its effort to reconnect with sub-Saharan Africa through energy and trade. Its flagship project is the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline, intended to carry Nigerian gas through Niger into Algeria and onward to Europe. Here, the UAE has a competing interest: the Trans-Saharan route directly competes with Morocco’s Atlantic pipeline, which is expected to run along the West African coast and which the UAE has backed with early financing.

It is against this backdrop that Algeria viewed a failed coup against Tiani on 29 August as threatening its interests. Rumours swirled in Algiers about an Emirati hand. To date, these are unsubstantiated, but they have only deepened suspicions regarding the UAE’s activities in the Sahel. Algeria responded to the coup attempt by deploying four Su-30MKA fighter jets to Niamey, accompanied by an Il-78 aerial-refuelling aircraft and an Il-76 transport plane. Algerian analysts told Crisis Group that mechanics, logistics specialists and personnel for force protection were also dispatched. Beyond sending a clear signal of support for Tiani’s government, these steps showcased Algeria’s determination to regain influence in a region where it has lost considerable ground – and where it appears to have identified the UAE as a chief antagonist.

Algeria’s actions also embodied something more, again with implications for relations with the UAE: a shift away from its longstanding aversion to military operations abroad. Since independence, Algeria’s leaders have framed the country’s foreign policy around non-alignment, anti-imperialism, national sovereignty, diplomatic mediation, South-South solidarity, support for national liberation and self-determination movements, and, importantly, non-interference in other states’ domestic affairs. There have been exceptions, and Algeria has at times interpreted this last precept flexibly when it has felt that it has important interests at stake. Overall, however, reluctance to dispatch regular military forces abroad has remained a powerful institutional constraint. Only in 2020 did a constitutional amendment create a legal framework for overseas deployments. The latter still require parliamentary approval and are restricted to internationally sanctioned missions.

More recently, the army’s top general Saïd Chengriha has promoted the concept that Algeria has “strategic borders”. Though it does not formally establish a right to military intervention in neighbouring countries, this notion expands Algeria’s security perimeter by treating instability, armed groups and trafficking networks beyond its frontiers as potential national security threats.

Rivalry in North Africa and the Horn

In other regional conflicts, Algeria and the UAE likewise stand on opposing sides. In Libya, Field Marshal Haftar’s forces have, over time, received extensive Emirati backing. In contrast, Algeria has stood with Tripoli (which itself has maintained tight relations with Niger). In Sudan, Algeria sides with the army, whose leaders it considers the country’s legitimate representatives; several Algerian analysts told Crisis Group that in 2025 Algiers discreetly provided the Sudanese army with equipment, including old Russian MiG-29 fighter jets and spare parts. By contrast, Abu Dhabi refers to the army-led administration as the “Port Sudan authority”, in reference to its erstwhile seat in Port Sudan, treating it merely as one party to the conflict; it is widely believed to be sending support to the army’s main adversary, the RSF, though the UAE denies the claim.

The divergent policies toward Sudan have had wider repercussions. Eastern and southern Libya reportedly have served as logistical corridors for supplies to the RSF allegedly originating with the Emirates. Previously, much of this materiel allegedly went through eastern Chad. For its part, the UAE maintains that its activities in eastern Chad are humanitarian, particularly getting aid to Sudanese refugees. An Algerian expert told Crisis Group that policymakers in Algiers appear intent on deepening ties with N’Djamena at least in part to counterbalance what they view as Sudan-linked Emirati networks in Chad. That said, Chadian President Idriss Déby has invested considerable political capital in his relationship with the UAE, whose substantial financial support, including a $1.5 billion budget financing agreement signed in 2023, gives the latter sway that Algeria would struggle to match.

The growing Algeria-UAE rivalry could deepen existing Libyan divisions and turn local disputes into arenas of indirect regional confrontation.

These competing relationships run the risk of reinforcing regional divisions, with Field Marshal Haftar and Chad being generally close to Abu Dhabi, while Tripoli and Niger cooperate more with Algiers. Conversely, the growing Algeria-UAE rivalry could deepen existing Libyan divisions and turn local disputes into arenas of indirect regional confrontation. To some extent, it already has. In August 2024, for example, Haftar’s forces moved toward Ghadames, only a few kilometres from the Algerian frontier, a development Algiers saw as threatening. The crisis eventually subsided after Haftar’s spokesman denied that the city was a military objective and insisted that the border with Algeria was secure. Still, the episode reinforced perceptions in Algiers of a UAE-backed menace in its neighbourhood.

Tensions continue to build. Algeria is increasingly concerned by Haftar’s influence in southern Libya, where his forces have tightened their grip on lucrative trafficking routes and strengthened cooperation with N’Djamena in fighting Chadian rebel groups. Haftar has thus obtained access to an important source of income and displaced Chadian rebels toward northern Niger, particularly the strategic Salvador Pass area, exacerbating instability near Algeria’s southern border.

All in all, these developments help explain Algeria’s evolving approach to regional security. Rather than viewing events in Libya, Niger and Sudan separately, Algiers increasingly sees them as interconnected challenges.

Containing the Clash

What began as a downturn in Algerian-UAE relations has thus evolved into a full-blown crisis with possible reverberations across the northern third of Africa. Algeria has remained silent as to why precisely it severed diplomatic ties. The foreign ministry’s statement was vague, referring to “provocative or hostile” actions as well as warnings that had failed to deter Abu Dhabi from unspecified behaviour. Algeria may have avoided identifying grievances or conditions for reconciliation in order to allow for flexibility in future talks. The difficulty of substantiating its complaints may also have contributed to its ambiguous stance.

To officials in Abu Dhabi, the break was both unanticipated and perplexing. Though he did not name Algeria, Anwar Gargash, a diplomatic adviser to the UAE president, alluded to it in a tweet complaining of “puzzles and signals that require decoding” in interstate relations. The UAE foreign ministry adopted a more conciliatory tone, expressing hope that the rupture would prove temporary. A number of Emirati analysts said the dispute is of far greater significance to Algeria than to the UAE, given Abu Dhabi’s preoccupation with the war in the Gulf. 

These reactions underscore a divergence in perspectives: while Algiers views Abu Dhabi’s alliances as a growing threat to its regional influence, Abu Dhabi sees its engagement as part of a strategy driven by political, economic and security interests that go beyond any bilateral relationship. In reality, neither country can bar the other from an ever more cutthroat arena. Too, governments and armed groups in the region cannot be neatly categorised into two rival blocs; each of Niger, Chad and the assorted Libyan players has its own agenda that may not align precisely with either Algerian or Emirati wishes. Still, as Algeria assumes a more assertive stance and the UAE pursues its geographically expansive approach, seemingly oblivious to, or at least underestimating the depth of Algeria’s concerns and its conviction that Abu Dhabi is challenging its position, bilateral tensions risk becoming more fraught.

Informal communication channels could help shed light on their respective intentions and minimise the chance of misinterpretation and accidental conflict.

The two countries would be far better served by taking steps and shifting their mindsets to help ensure that Emirati influence in Algeria’s neighbourhood, and Algiers’ response to it, do not become a trigger for bilateral confrontation. First, though full reconciliation may be out of reach for the moment, maintaining or restoring informal communication channels could help shed light on their respective intentions and minimise the chance of misinterpretation and accidental conflict. Secondly, Algiers should avoid construing every Emirati undertaking in neighbouring countries as part of a strategy directed against its interests. Finally, Abu Dhabi ought to take Algeria’s security concerns more seriously. It should recognise that its regional partnerships, particularly those involving armed non-state actors, may threaten Algerian interests, even when not so intended.

Both countries should have an interest in preventing local disputes from drawing them further toward confrontation, particularly given that both neighbouring governments and armed groups pursue agendas neither side can fully control. Absent such efforts, the rift could deepen, increasing the risk that local crises spiral into open hostility.

The result would be to exacerbate tensions in a region already riven by deadly conflict.

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