Somalia Awaits a New Security Order as Mission Drawdown Looms

The AU mission and its UN logistics support office – the mainstay of foreign assistance for Somalia’s security – rely on troops from Africa and funds from farther afield. Ugandan troops were the first to be deployed upon the mission’s launch in 2007, followed soon thereafter by forces from Burundi and Djibouti. Kenya and Ethiopia joined in 2012 and 2014, respectively, after first launching their own bilateral interventions to safeguard their borders from Al-Shabaab incursions. The mission pushed the jihadist group out of many urban centres in south-central Somalia in the 2010s, including Mogadishu in 2011.

More recently, however, the AU has struggled to find money for the mission, with long-time donors like the EU whittling down their contributions and pushing for the exit door. The mission has been running a large deficit for several years, even as it has taken measures to cut spending. Troop numbers have dwindled from 22,000 in the mid-2010s to around 12,000 today. Instead of launching offensive operations deep in the hinterlands controlled by Al-Shabaab, the mission has turned more toward protecting urban areas it already holds, while playing a supporting role in Somali army campaigns.

The financial crunch has since extended to the UN’s logistical support, funded through UN assessed contributions – mandatory dues paid by all member states to underwrite the global body’s operations. Even before the Trump administration took office, U.S. officials were wary of the model that sees UN finances flow to a non-UN mission, regarding it as an undesirable precedent. In early 2025, the U.S. blocked a proposal for the AU mission to also receive funding through UN assessed contributions, arguing in part that the UN is already spending heavily on UNSOS. In September 2025, the U.S. shelved planned contributions to the UN peacekeeping budget, including for UNSOS. Hence, its refusal to support the office’s existence any further does not come as a complete surprise.

Much as Washington has no wish to see an Al-Shabaab resurgence, it seems to be pulling the plug on a setup that has done much to keep the group in check. Despite this apparent contradiction, the U.S. government believes that the status quo is no longer tenable: the multilateral missions are not as effective as they once were, while the Somali government should bear the primary responsibility for leading the fight with Al-Shabaab. U.S. diplomats believe that Somali elites are skirting their duties, preoccupied with pursuing political vendettas rather than combating jihadists. It is difficult to know if President Donald Trump’s evident personal animus toward Somalia has also played a role.

A number of U.S. officials agree that ending UNSOS, and by extension threatening the existence of the AU mission, is a risk. It was probably for this reason that the U.S. backtracked in September to grant the UN mission an additional twelve months to draw down. But this move only defers rather than eliminates the challenges ahead. The U.S. argues that Mogadishu can keep Al-Shabaab at bay by enhancing the deployment of Somali forces, and combining this measure with assistance from abroad, including troops from neighbouring countries and air support from the U.S. and Türkiye. The U.S. says it remains ready to contribute to fighting Al-Shabaab. It just no longer wants to do so through a multilateral vehicle that it regards as an unnecessary expense.

Are There Alternatives to UNSOS?

The drawdown and eventual closure of UNSOS would, in effect, mean that the AU mission could not continue as currently designed. The UN mission keeps AU troops supplied with food, water and fuel, sustaining nearly 50 bases across southern Somalia. It also provides transport for AU deployments. When funds permit, it supports Somali soldiers operating alongside the AU personnel. Privately, AU officials say the mission cannot continue without UN support: one termed the U.S. decision on the UNOSOS mandate “life-threatening”. Even with a twelve-month stay of execution, the UN support office’s coming year will be focused on winding down its extensive logistical responsibilities.

Deciding what comes next has become imperative for the Somali authorities. A few options for logistical assistance for the AU mission have been mooted, but all face serious drawbacks. In July, the Somali government, the AU and troop-contributing states met in the Ugandan capital Kampala to discuss the mission’s future. They endorsed a plan for uninterrupted support for another eighteen to 24 months, a period that would be used to carry out offensives against Al-Shabaab and a more gradual drawdown. For Washington, however, an extension of UN support beyond what is now on the table is out of the question, a stance it communicated in September.

Another option would be for the AU to use the time UNSOS has left to replace it with an AU logistical mission. But given the AU’s lack of experience in running such a complex operation, this option appears unworkable in the near term. The AU could subcontract logistics to a private company, but diplomats note that it would take up to two years to establish a mission with capabilities similar to those of UNSOS. Even if it were possible, the financial crunch would not vanish. With the AU mission unable even to cover troop stipends, there is no way at present that it could shoulder the costs of logistics. The deeper pockets of partners alarmed by the possibility of an imminent worsening of Somali security, such as the EU or Gulf Arab countries, might be prised open to an extent. But with so many other crises competing for resources, a donor boost remains a long shot.

Alternatively, the AU could take whatever funding is available from the EU and others, channelling it toward covering troop stipends and the logistics of a smaller mission. This option would enable the AU to maintain its presence, but only by sacrificing its operational clout, perhaps by retrenching at a few key locations, most likely in and around Mogadishu and regional capitals. But countries contributing troops to the AU mission already argue they do not have enough personnel to protect themselves, let alone undertake forward operations. Reducing their numbers further could end up at a point where the mission is unable to defend itself or others from Al-Shabaab attack. With limited funding committed for 2026 and nothing beyond that, the AU might also find it difficult to win donors over to the idea of supporting a less effective version of the same mission.

A further variant of this option is being floated in Addis Ababa, where the AU has its headquarters: reconfiguring the mission under a new regional mechanism, but still with an AU mandate. In this scenario, many of the African troops deployed in Somalia would stay, but under a setup not unlike the Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad basin, a regional initiative to combat Boko Haram. Parallels with the Lake Chad basin are imperfect, however: the various national militaries operating there largely do so inside their own frontiers, coordinating more on cross-border matters. The proposal also offers little by way of a solution to the logistics and funding dilemmas, simply passing the buck to troop-contributing states.

One or another of these options might emerge to enable Somalia’s multilateral security support to stagger on past 2027. The U.S. decision to grant an extra twelve months buys time to evaluate all the options and allows for less haste in the overhaul. But one way or another, a transition, with all its uncertainties, appears imminent.

Turning to Somali Forces

The AU’s exit strategy is premised on Somali forces standing ready to take the mission’s place when it finally shuts down. There is no doubt that the Somali National Army has boosted its strength in recent years, generating upward of 10,000 new troops under training schemes supported by foreign partners like Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates and Eritrea. But it is still ill-prepared to fully and rapidly take the AU mission’s place. Certain areas handed over by the mission to Somali forces in recent years have later fallen into Al-Shabaab’s hands. Even when the Somali army has led operations against Al-Shabaab, such as in Lower Shabelle in 2025-2026, it has remained dependent on external support. 

Somali officials have argued for many years that they can take full responsibility for security, but that they need more time. Many in the current government and its predecessors have wanted Somali forces to step up, only to find themselves hamstrung by political rifts within the federal system that have weakened the national security apparatus. State-level forces are generally underdeveloped, while the divisions between federal officials and leaders in Puntland and Jubaland, who are at loggerheads over how power and resources are divided in Somalia’s federal system, hinder the emergence of a unified national army. During times of political crisis, such as the election-related turmoil at present, federal and state forces sometimes turn their guns on each other.

These shortcomings have driven Mogadishu to establish a series of bilateral security agreements with Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia, ensuring that their troops will stay despite the AU mission’s withdrawal. Uganda reportedly has a force of around 2,000 troops stationed in and around Mogadishu, while Kenya and Ethiopia retain larger contingents closer to their own borders. Bilateral foreign forces in Somalia have remained stable even as the AU mission shrinks, a trend that will probably continue after its eventual departure.

What Could a New Security Approach Look Like?

The AU mission’s future is for now unclear. While replacing support from the UN, and possibly finding a substitute for the mission, would undoubtedly be a huge undertaking, the situation is not hopeless. With proper planning, political leadership and a measure of continued foreign backing, the Somali government should be able to shift from dependence on a multilateral force to a series of bilateral relationships that prevent a major security breakdown and sweeping military gains by Al-Shabaab. That said, there is little doubt that the impending loss of the UN support office’s annual spending on Somali security needs will cause headaches.

Even if the AU manages somehow to retain a presence, the most likely shape of Somalia’s future security support will derive chiefly from the deeply rooted interests of Mogadishu’s foreign partners. Key members of the AU mission, particularly Kenya and Ethiopia, are primarily motivated by border security, particularly the desire to maintain a buffer against Al-Shabaab. Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni views his country’s longstanding deployment as a key part of his legacy. He likely holds out hope that Mogadishu will be able to find a donor to pay for Ugandan units stationed around the capital. From outside the region, Türkiye has become Somalia’s most important bilateral partner in recent years, training thousands of Somali troops as well as deploying advanced military assets like drones and F-16s. Ankara also remains keen to protect its wide-ranging strategic investments in the country. The U.S., for its part, asserts that it will, for now, maintain its bilateral counter-terrorism operations, particularly its drone program.

Making full use of these various bilateral arrangements is the most pragmatic way to go about preventing a serious deterioration in security after UNSOS closes, regardless of what happens to the AU mission, while buying more time for the Somali military to assume greater responsibility. The AU mission’s major troop contributors would ideally keep most of their contingents where they are, arranging their own logistics in the process, but changes are likely. The loss of UNSOS assistance will probably spur Kenya and Ethiopia into consolidating positions nearer their own borders, while Uganda will probably focus more on protecting Mogadishu and its environs. Smaller troop contributors like Burundi and Djibouti, on the other hand, may be less inclined to continue without additional support.

In areas where foreign troops do withdraw, Somali forces should prepare to take over. Mogadishu claimed in early August that it has 14,000 troops available for military operations, who could instead be deployed as holding forces to take the place of departing AU personnel. Somali troops tend not to be as well trained or equipped as their AU counterparts, however, making a one-to-one switch from AU to Somali soldiers a hazardous proposition.

Taking these steps might contain Al-Shabaab to its rural bastions and avoid the loss of major cities. Proper coordination with bilateral forces could help protect the most strategically important areas, including towns, infrastructure and supply routes. But a modest fallback from some of the positions that are now under the AU mission’s control seems inevitable. Uganda, for example, maintains more than a dozen bases in the Lower Shabelle region, which will be difficult to hold without UNSOS logistical support. Smaller towns surrounded by Al-Shabaab, such as Qoryoley, could be at risk of falling to the insurgents once the AU pulls out. Parts of Hirshabelle would also be vulnerable due to the concentration of Al-Shabaab forces in the area since 2025, adding pressure to towns along the main road in the state, such as Jalalaqsi. Even small losses could give momentum back to Al-Shabaab, while the capture of roads and economic centres would help sustain the group financially.

It may be possible over the coming years to keep parts of the battlefield tilted in the Somali authorities’ favour through the calibrated deployment of foreign troops, especially when it comes to the defence of urban centres and transport arteries. Still, the systemic challenges to Somali security thrown up by a radical change in security arrangements cannot be wished away. If they are left unaddressed, the danger will rise of greater government losses and an Al-Shabaab surge outside its rural strongholds.

First, shifting the security burden onto African states will not resolve the funding problem unless donors and Somali officials take bold steps. If the AU wants to remain involved, it will have to do more to raise its own funds. If not, the AU mission’s current backers – primarily the EU and UK, which in 2025 together contributed approximately $90 million – could find ways to transfer this support to cover logistics and stipends for troop-contributing states from the region and Somali forces. Gulf Arab states, which number among Somalia’s key backers, may even be more inclined to support bilateral forces, viewing multilateral support as a poor investment because it translates into minimal diplomatic influence. Even though its resources are strained, the Somali government could also reduce the burden on foreign donors: the government has managed to raise domestic revenue in recent years and has even funded a number of internal military operations and deployments. The more it can take on, the less it will need to lobby the same donors on behalf of other African troop contributors.

Secondly, the Somali government, troop-contributing countries and donors will need a forum in which to debate the country’s security needs and priorities. Security coordination within the AU mission has often proven a challenge, but the mission’s guiding framework helped ensure that its contributors adhered to a basic common strategy. The government should now establish a new forum that would meet regularly to coordinate with its bilateral partners, enabling Mogadishu to impress upon them the country’s main security requirements and hopefully curbing the pursuit of individual interests by troop-contributing states. Somalia’s security partners in turn should focus on fulfilling their security roles and avoid meddling in local politics in their areas of operation. A forum could also be an opportunity for the government to detail a national plan for Somalia’s future security, which would help assuage local concerns that a transition might leave some parts of the country better protected than others.

Without effective coordination, bilateral security relationships could hasten the country’s fragmentation by fracturing it into various zones of influence that overlap with Somalia’s current divisions between the federal authorities and assertive member states. Furthermore, there is a risk that powerful partners might look to Mogadishu to provide exclusive concessions – economic or otherwise – in return for military assistance. Better coordination with multiple partners will help the Somali authorities handle these demands and keep the focus on making the country safe. With negotiations on the AU mission’s next mandate set to kick off at the UN Security Council by December, Somalia would benefit greatly from having a plan and buy-in from security partners in place by then.

What Should Happen Now?

Somalia’s multilateral security system has been limping toward its finale for several years. Establishing a new model without the UN support office and possibly the AU mission will be arduous; a series of bilateral security relationships is unlikely to match what multilateral deployments have achieved. Current funding and geopolitical realities, however, make this shift the most realistic option beyond 2027.

The government should be using the time it has to make this change work. A clear grasp of the challenges ahead would be a good place to start. Diplomats from some of Mogadishu’s security partners say both the government and the AU expect that further compromises can be hammered out over the future of UNSOS. If so, that confidence is misplaced. The Trump administration appears intent on seeing the end of the UN support mission, even if it has signalled that more time is available to allow for a smoother transition. It is also hard to gauge how much UNSOS will be able to do in 2027 as it focuses on its liquidation.

Rather than assume business as usual, Mogadishu and its partners should use the temporary reprieve they have been granted to construct a new security system that can kick into action as early as the second half of 2027. The Somali government should urgently convene its security partners to establish a broad division of responsibilities and priorities to follow the departure of UNSOS. Setting out a viable plan for the country after UN support winds down also has a better chance of attracting fresh donor backing.

A shift primarily to bilateral support is still a temporary measure, and it should only buy time for a lasting solution to the country’s troubles: a Somali government that can manage its own security needs. Mogadishu’s shortcoming in achieving this goal, despite two decades of foreign support, is rooted in entrenched political divisions rather than just financial and technical challenges. In the short term, the government should be ready to deploy troops to areas likely to be vacated by foreign troops; it should launch major new offensives only once the transition has been consolidated. But for the security transition to work over the long term, Somalia’s government and political class must address their political divisions and row in the same direction. They could start to do so by resolving the dispute regarding the timing and format for elections, continuing by concluding these polls swiftly so that an incoming administration with a clear mandate can take office.

The new administration should make preparing for a security transition an overriding priority. It should lay out a plan for how Somali forces can take over from foreign troops, including by bringing federal member states into discussions regarding the future of Somali security. Such a plan is the best way to realise the country’s full sovereignty – an oft-stated ambition of the Somali government. But the longer political disputes drag on, the greater the risk that the transition to Somali forces falters and Al-Shabaab resurges.

The U.S. decision to pull the plug on UNSOS appears to be a defining act in the decline of Somalia’s multilateral security system. In its aftermath, short-term gains by Al-Shabaab look inevitable.

But a well-managed transition should help mitigate any losses and lay the groundwork for Somalia’s eventual stability.