Five years after mounting a coup that ousted an elected civilian government, Min Aung Hlaing has overseen tightly staged elections transitioning him from commander-in-chief to president.
Foreign governments should ensure interaction with Naypyitaw is calibrated, so as not to confer unwarranted legitimacy on the administration.
What’s new? A new administration has assumed office in Myanmar following stage-managed elections, with coup leader Min Aung Hlaing becoming president. Despite the civilian façade, the military retains control. With China’s backing, the regime’s diplomatic and battlefield prospects have improved, but lack of legitimacy and economic shocks mean the crisis will persist.
Why does it matter? Myanmar’s instability increasingly has transnational repercussions, with political and economic turmoil driving the expansion of organised crime – including scam centres, narcotics production, illicit financial flows and human trafficking – as well as risky cross-border labour migration. At the same time, indispensable Chinese support is drawing Naypyitaw further into Beijing’s orbit.
What should be done? Foreign governments should make Myanmar a higher priority and calibrate any engagement with Naypyitaw, while retaining existing sanctions. Important elements include negotiating humanitarian access and expanding livelihoods programs – including through non-state channels – as well as assisting civil society, tackling transnational crime and addressing downstream risks in critical mineral supply chains.
I. Overview
A nominally civilian administration has taken power in Naypyitaw following tightly controlled elections, consolidating military rule within the framework of the 2008 constitution while leaving the underlying drivers of conflict unchanged. Aided by an unpopular conscription drive and stronger Chinese support, the authorities have halted their battlefield losses and reduced their diplomatic isolation. But the country’s political divides remain intact, and the fallout of the Middle East conflict is causing severe economic strain. Myanmar’s instability is increasingly spilling across borders – manifest in scam centres with victims worldwide, narcotics production, illicit financial flows and human trafficking. All the while, Naypyitaw is growing closer to Beijing. Given the transnational implications, foreign states and bodies should make Myanmar a higher priority. They should tread carefully in engaging the regime, with the aim of strengthening humanitarian, livelihood and civil society support. Foreign governments should also better coordinate efforts to fight transnational crime and manage related financial risks.
Five years after the February 2021 coup that ousted the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi, power rests with an administration that is civilian in form but not in substance. Coup leader Min Aung Hlaing’s move from commander-in-chief to president underscores that the elections brought about not a political transition or a reduction in conflict, but rather a consolidation of abusive military rule. The electoral outcome was scripted, with the main opposition parties excluded and people in large parts of the country unable – and, in many cases, unwilling – to cast their ballots. While the polls have provided the military with a procedural basis for its continued grip on power, they have not conferred any new legitimacy upon the leadership or created conditions for ending the country’s devastating civil war. The deep gulf between the military and society persists, particularly among younger generations, and the grievances that fuelled resistance to the coup are unlikely to dissipate.
For Min Aung Hlaing, this outcome should have marked a triumph following a turbulent post-coup period in which the military faced serious battlefield setbacks and regime insiders began to openly question his leadership. With Chinese backing, he was able to keep his footing and carry out his plan to assume the presidency, installing loyalists in key positions with little sign of internal resistance. But instead of success, the current moment is one of further jeopardy. The new administration faces a spiralling economic crisis as a result of war in the Middle East, exposing the harm wrought by the coup and its aftermath, which has left the economy highly vulnerable to external shocks. Naypyitaw will be particularly nervous at the prospect of economic hardship morphing into popular unrest, as happened in 1988 and 2007. The authorities will seek to maintain access to essential goods in urban areas at tolerable prices, but their ability to do so is limited, and the burden is falling on a population already under heavy strain.
On the battlefield, the front lines have stabilised, but the conflict has not abated.
On the battlefield, the front lines have stabilised, but the conflict has not abated. After losing ground in 2023-2024, the military has regained a measure of momentum, aided by conscription, improved drone capabilities and, critically, Chinese support. Beijing-brokered ceasefires with major armed groups in the north have eased pressure on the military, allowing redeployment to other theatres, which has led to territorial gains. These advances reverse some of the military’s earlier losses but fall well short of a return to its pre-coup levels of territorial control. The military continues to struggle against its most capable opponents, particularly the Arakan Army and the Kachin Independence Organisation, both of which are battle-hardened and well-financed.
Prospects for a countrywide peace process are bleak. While the authorities may pursue tactical ceasefire deals with leading armed groups, these are unlikely to develop into durable settlements. Broader political dialogue is even less likely, given the apparent absence of appetite for concessions within the military leadership. At the same time, opposition forces – particularly the National Unity Government created by lawmakers who were ousted in the 2021 coup – have yet to demonstrate the cohesion or vision required to convert political grievance and economic distress into sustained pressure for change.
Against this backdrop, and amid turmoil elsewhere in the world, Myanmar is slipping further down the international agenda. Western countries have rightly kept targeted sanctions on the military leadership and its business interests in place, but they have little in the way of a broader diplomatic strategy. Foreign capitals should not lose sight of Myanmar’s plight, which increasingly has transnational implications – including the expansion of organised crime, the rise of illicit financial flows and human trafficking linked to scam centres, increased cross-border migration and associated exploitation, and risks to critical mineral supply chains. A more effective international approach will require focusing on a set of realistic objectives: ensuring that any interaction with Naypyitaw is calibrated and issue-specific, so as not to confer unwarranted legitimacy on the administration; boosting funding for humanitarian and livelihood programs and civil society support; enhancing cooperation to counter transnational crime; addressing risks linked to critical mineral supply chains; and coordinating policies more closely, including pragmatic engagement with China where possible.
II. A New Political Order in Naypyitaw
A. The Election Outcome
Almost five years after the coup, Myanmar held elections in three phases from December 2025 to January 2026. 1 As expected, they delivered the regime’s desired result: a decisive parliamentary majority for the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), in a contest that bore little resemblance to a genuine popular vote. 2 The polls took place amid widespread armed conflict and repression, with most credible political parties absent and large parts of the country excluded from participation. As such, the outcome provides a procedural basis for a return to governance under the military-drafted 2008 constitution, but it is not – and was never intended to be – a meaningful expression of popular sentiment. Numerous incidents of deadly violence occurred during the election period, albeit at a lower intensity than opponents had threatened and many observers had feared, reflecting both the extent of regime repression and widespread disenchantment with the process.
The regime tightly circumscribed the electoral playing field. 3 The National League for Democracy (NLD), which won an overwhelming mandate in 2020, and before that in 2015, was dissolved after refusing to register under the regime’s post-coup legal framework, while most other large parties either declined to participate or were consigned to the margins. The remaining parties were either small, regionally confined or aligned to varying degrees with the military authorities. The USDP’s dominance was assured even before voting began, a position reinforced by a repressive set of electoral regulations that limited competition and, in some cases, disqualified even regime-friendly contenders. 4 In the end, it won 339 of the 420 contested seats. Given that the 2008 constitution reserves 25 per cent of parliamentary seats for military appointees, military-friendly lawmakers make up over 86 per cent of the new parliament (see graphic below).
The lack of genuine competition is reinforced by the fact that the second-largest bloc of elected seats is held by another establishment party, the National Unity Party, set up by the former socialist regime to contest the 1990 elections. The new legislature is also male-dominated, with women MPs making up less than 14 per cent of elected representatives and some 17 per cent of military appointees. 5
Participation was also sharply curtailed. Polling was cancelled in large parts of the country affected by armed conflict or outside regime control; in many constituencies where voting did take place, only a few polling stations were opened in urban areas. Turnout was low in any case, due to widespread public apathy or outright hostility toward the process – only 54 per cent of eligible voters, according to the authorities, cast a ballot. 6
The electoral system itself added a layer of opacity. The introduction of a mixed system combining first-past-the-post constituencies with proportional representation constituencies, alongside the first-ever use of electronic voting machines, designed in Myanmar, reduced transparency and increased the scope for irregularities. 7
Taken together, these conditions produced a predictable landslide for the USDP, setting the stage for installation of a nominally civilian administration under the 2008 constitution. The elections thus achieved their core objective: providing a formal mechanism to end the post-coup state of emergency and perpetuate military rule within the existing constitutional setup. The timing also aligned with Myanmar’s standard five-year electoral cycle – not the junta’s primary consideration, but a convenient procedural bonus.
At the same time, the process has done little to alter underlying tensions. The exclusion of major opposition forces, the limited territorial reach of the state and the absence of broad public participation mean that the new political order remains fundamentally contested. Rather than resolving the political crisis created by the coup, the elections have perpetuated it, embedding military dominance behind a civilian façade, while leaving the main drivers of the conflict unchanged.
B. Formation of the New Administration
The new nominally civilian administration took power on 11 April. 8 As expected, on 3 April the parliament – acting as an electoral college – chose junta leader Min Aung Hlaing as president. 9 Analysts and Naypyitaw insiders have long suggested that he coveted the position, and the 2021 coup was clearly a bid not only to reassert the military’s dominance in Myanmar’s political system, by neutralising the NLD and its leader Aung San Suu Kyi, but also to advance his personal political ambitions. 10 Those ambitions had been constrained both by the NLD’s overwhelming popular support and by the precedent set in 2015 for elections that, while imperfect, broadly reflected voter preferences and produced a decisive popular mandate. 11
Myanmar now has as president an individual who is alleged to have committed atrocities against the Rohingya. Min Aung Hlaing was commander-in-chief during the military’s 2017 operations in Rakhine State, which drove over 700,000 Rohingya into Bangladesh amid allegations of mass killings, sexual violence and widespread destruction. 12 In November 2024, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) requested that judges issue a warrant for his arrest on charges of crimes against humanity (deportation and persecution) in connection with the 2017 campaign. 13 The court’s judges have not publicly ruled on this request, though it is possible that they have issued a sealed warrant, meaning that Min Aung Hlaing might be in legal jeopardy should he travel to an ICC state party or another state likely to act on an ICC warrant.
The events of 2017 are also the subject of a case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), where Myanmar is alleged to have committed genocide and other violations of the Genocide Convention, including failures to prevent and punish such acts; a final judgment is expected within months. 14
Min Aung Hlaing has ensured that loyalists occupy other key positions. The two other presidential candidates – Nyo Saw, the junta’s prime minister, and Nan Ni Ni Aye, the USDP’s Kayin State chair – became first and second vice presidents, respectively, with Nan Ni Ni Aye being one of the few women appointed to a senior role. 15 The constitution required Min Aung Hlaing to retire from the military upon becoming a presidential candidate. 16 Accordingly, on 30 March he stepped down as commander-in-chief, handing the role to General Ye Win Oo, a close ally and former head of military intelligence who had recently been elevated to army chief. 17 General Kyaw Swar Lin, who held the number-three position in the military, was promoted to deputy commander-in-chief, replacing Vice Senior General Soe Win, who retired from the military and was appointed by Min Aung Hlaing to head his presidential advisory council. 18
Overall, the senior executive, military and legislative appointments represent the new president’s preferred configuration.
Parliamentary appointments held few surprises. In the lower house, USDP leader Khin Yi was elected speaker, with Min Aung Hlaing ally and former information minister Maung Maung Ohn as deputy speaker, while the upper house voted for recently retired general Aung Lin Dwe – also a confidant of Min Aung Hlaing – as speaker and former junta member Jeng Phang Naw Taung as deputy. 19 The only apparent concession to other elite figures is the appointment of Khin Yi – an experienced political operator who is older than Min Aung Hlaing and whom he does not fully trust. 20 But overall, the senior executive, military and legislative appointments represent the new president’s preferred configuration, a sign that he faced no major internal pushback in carrying out his plans. 21
That said, there are indications of discontent among longstanding USDP members, who feel that, despite winning a landslide, party stalwarts have been mostly sidelined in favour of recently retired military officers loyal to Min Aung Hlaing. 22 Some have reportedly complained that party leaders instructed them to nominate the junta leader for the presidency with little prior notice. 23 Min Aung Hlaing’s exclusion of USDP figures from important executive roles (see Section II.C below) adds a further source of tension. Whether these gripes will lead to dissent over time is uncertain. A key issue will be how Khin Yi positions himself and the extent to which he resists presidential authority, however subtly.
Whether the legislature as a whole will serve as a check on presidential power will depend heavily on how its new leaders manage it. On paper, the 2008 constitution sets a low threshold, requiring only a single parliamentary session per year, and the assembly’s design – with no provision for MPs to have offices, staff or policy and research support – suggests that it was never intended to be a meaningful counterweight to the executive. 24 Min Aung Hlaing will seek to avoid a repeat of earlier confrontations between the presidency and parliament, notably during the Thein Sein era (2011-2016), when the USDP speaker used the legislature to challenge government decisions. 25
At the same time, turning parliament into a purely symbolic body will not be straightforward. During the decade before the coup, it was more active than originally envisaged, meeting regularly, scrutinising legislation and engaging in substantive debate, including with participation from military-appointed lawmakers. 26 Hence legislators have developed expectations and practices that will be difficult to dislodge, opening space for opponents of Min Aung Hlaing within the USDP to challenge his authority if they so choose.
C. Prospects for Reform
There are no indications that the emergence of the new administration in Naypyitaw will lead to meaningful political reform. The military in effect crossed the Rubicon after the 2021 coup, resorting not only to large-scale violence against the population to suppress dissent and entrench its rule, but also to deliberate, demonstrative brutality designed to terrorise. 27 Unlike the period following the 2010 elections, when elements of the system were open to liberalisation, there is scant evidence today of a reform constituency within the leadership. The coup and subsequent violence have polarised the military and society in a way that makes consensus building unlikely, despite laudable recent calls by veteran politicians. 28 There has been no sign of a policy rethink within the military elite or outreach to external expertise that might suggest a shift in direction. 29 Nor does the current group of leaders resemble a return to the pre-2011 military regime; it is instead a more cautious, defensive configuration shaped by a national uprising and armed conflict, during which it has felt itself to be under existential threat.
Min Aung Hlaing appointed a new cabinet largely carried over from the junta administration, with only a handful of USDP members given executive roles – in marginal portfolios such as cooperatives, tourism and youth affairs. 30 Many USDP members expected that the landslide victory would give the party greater influence in governance; they resent the extent to which key executive positions went to retired officers loyal to Min Aung Hlaing personally. Tensions between the president and the party appear likely to increase as a result. The lineup suggests limited scope for policy change, reinforced by the president’s inaugural speech, which offered no new political direction and largely restated justifications for the coup and themes from his earlier speeches as junta leader. 31 While several ministers have experience and technocratic skills, particularly in the economic and social sectors, their capacity to perform effectively is likely to be constrained by limited public trust, Min Aung Hlaing’s reluctance to delegate authority and a worsening macro-economic environment.
The choice of a new foreign minister is also revealing. Tin Maung Swe previously served as ambassador to China and was one of the few Myanmar diplomats with a direct line to Min Aung Hlaing. 32 The appointment of someone who understands Beijing’s thinking and helped develop close ties underscores China’s influence. His predecessor, Than Swe, was a more globally oriented diplomat who served as ambassador to the U.S. during the Thein Sein administration and helped steer the normalisation of relations.
The spillover effects of the Middle East conflict … represent a grave shock to an already fragile economy.
A priority for the new administration will be to contain mounting external economic pressures. The spillover effects of the Middle East conflict – particularly scarcity and sharply higher prices for fuel and fertiliser – represent a grave shock to an already fragile economy. Myanmar’s heavy dependence on imported energy, combined with limited foreign exchange reserves, has triggered acute fuel shortages and steep price increases, with knock-on effects upon transport, electricity supply and agricultural production. 33 The disruption has already affected domestic aviation and ground transport, with reports of severe delays to freight and growing reliance on expensive black-market fuel. 34 If shortages persist into the main monsoon rice planting and fertiliser application period, which peaks in June-July, the impact on agricultural output – and hence, food security – could be severe.
These developments are a serious blow to Min Aung Hlaing. His assumption of the presidency and the first weeks of his new, nominally civilian administration were supposed to showcase stability and control, ushering in a brighter era with him at the helm of the state. But while he may have contemplated relaxing some economic restrictions, such as capital controls, Naypyitaw now faces deepening financial turmoil that is laying bare the failures of the past five years. As a result, the authorities are likely to turn to short-term, reactive measures.
Given Myanmar’s history of price shocks triggering street protests – the 1988 uprising and, more recently, the Saffron Revolution of 2007 that followed a sharp increase in fuel prices – the authorities will be particularly concerned about the risk of urban unrest. 35 But while their priority is likely to be maintaining access to essential goods in urban areas, at tolerable prices, in order to mitigate these risks, their ability to do so is constrained as tight fiscal conditions, limited foreign exchange reserves and supply disruptions have all reduced their capacity to subsidise key goods or stabilise prices. 36
In practice, much of the burden is falling on the public, which was already facing deepening hardship. The military will continue to have preferential access to fuel and food for its own operations, which will limit immediate battlefield disruptions, but is also likely to stoke popular resentment. Among the few coping strategies available to the people of Myanmar is labour migration, to centres of illicit economic activity or the informal labour market in Thailand, both of which come with risks of exploitation.
Nor does it appear likely that political change will be forced on Naypyitaw from outside the system. The National Unity Government (NUG), formed by lawmakers ousted in the coup, is not well placed to capitalise on the economic shock to apply meaningful pressure on the authorities. Over the last two years, it has faced increasing internal and external criticism for excessive bureaucracy, limited transparency in the use of funds and weak responses to allegations of misconduct within its ranks. 37 More fundamentally, it has struggled to articulate a coherent strategy for effecting political change or to build and sustain the broad coalitions required to do so, particularly with ethnic political leaders and armed groups.
The election has compounded these challenges. By grounding its legitimacy in the 2020 poll results and presenting itself as a parallel government rather than a revolutionary movement, the NUG faces questions about its mandate now that the electoral term has expired. 38 But regardless of these political and institutional weaknesses, popular opposition to military rule remains widespread and will find a political outlet in one form or another.
III. Impact on the Armed Conflict
The post-coup conflict has not abated, but its trajectory is uncertain, with the military regaining ground in some areas while continuing to face strong resistance in others. The new administration may try to negotiate ceasefires with major armed groups, but if they emerge these are likely to be tactical deals driven by short-term calculations rather than a pathway to a broader political settlement.
A. A Mixed Picture on the Battlefield
After facing existential battlefield threats in 2024, Myanmar’s military has regained a degree of momentum and reasserted itself in parts of the country. Several factors have contributed to this shift. The introduction of conscription in early 2024 boosted the military’s ranks, allowing it to stabilise front lines and deploy reinforcements for local counteroffensives. 39 The military has also adapted tactically, achieving some success in integrating drone warfare and drone countermeasures into its operations, helping offset what had been a major vulnerability given resistance forces’ widespread use of weaponised commercial versions of these devices. 40 Greater decentralisation of command, particularly for authorising air and artillery strikes, has also improved its overall responsiveness on the battlefield. 41
External support has been critical: China’s backing, in particular, has boosted the military’s position, both directly and indirectly. Beijing has provided military hardware, including fighter jets, drones and counter-drone systems, while also leveraging its influence over key armed groups in the north – by pressing the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) into ceasefires. Critically, it also pushed the United Wa State Army to curtail arms sales to resistance forces, raising prices and constraining access to weapons and ammunition on the black market. 42
This intervention has been particularly consequential in northern Shan State, where it halted a series of opposition advances that had overrun or threatened strategic towns, military bases and supply lines, as well as nationally important trade routes. 43 As part of the ceasefire deal, the MNDAA handed the town of Lashio back to the military in April 2025, while the TNLA withdrew from Nawnghkio under military pressure that July. Regime forces subsequently retook Kyaukme and Hsipaw from the group in October, restoring partial control of the critical Mandalay-Muse trade artery. 44 As part of its ceasefire, the TNLA also withdrew in November from the ruby mining hub of Mogoke in Mandalay Region and the nearby town of Momeik. 45
The resulting stabilisation in the north has enabled the military to redeploy forces to other theatres. Thanks in part to these reinforcements, it has pushed back resistance groups in Kayah State, parts of the central Dry Zone and sections of the south east, reversing earlier losses. In Mandalay Region, the TNLA-backed Mandalay People’s Defence Force and its allies had advanced to within around 20km of the city by July 2024. 46 But over the last year the military has regrouped and launched a series of counteroffensives, retaking Thabeikkyin town in July 2025 and Singu in December, and capturing the last remaining resistance-held town in Mandalay Region, Tagaung, on 10 March 2026, after a month-long advance supported by intensive air and artillery strikes. 47 Resistance forces, however, continue to control many rural areas.
The military has not achieved similar success against its most capable opponents, particularly the Arakan Army and the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO). In Rakhine State, the Arakan Army continues to threaten Sittwe and Kyaukphyu towns, two of the last three patches of the state still under Naypyitaw’s control. 48 The Arakan Army has also expanded operations to the east, in nearby parts of Magway Region and elsewhere, capturing hilltop bases and limiting the military’s ability to mount counteroffensives from central Myanmar. 49 In Kachin State, the KIO also remains a tough opponent. While the military’s resurgence has allowed it to stem further losses, so far it has been unable to drive the KIO out of key areas. 50
B. Prospects for Ceasefires or Political Dialogue
Over the past 75 years of insurgency in Myanmar, the military has repeatedly pursued ceasefires with ethnic armed groups as a tool for managing conflict rather than resolving it, above all with an eye on limiting the number of active fronts. 51 Some past agreements, particularly those negotiated in the late 1980s and 1990s, proved durable, offering de facto autonomy and economic concessions to armed groups – particularly, freedom to engage in lucrative illicit activities – in return for an end to fighting. 52 But while, in these instances, the regime sought accommodation, it retained firm control of the country’s core areas and main arteries. Today, the situation is reversed: the military is weaker and its opponents stronger, reducing the scope for mutually advantageous deals. Limited or externally driven ceasefires – such as those brokered by China with the MNDAA and TNLA in northern Shan State – are more plausible, but they are specific to conditions in the China borderlands and thus difficult to replicate. Any further ceasefires that do emerge are therefore likely to be tactical and unstable.
The military is focused on cutting deals with its most powerful opponents. It has had informal contacts with the Arakan Army about a possible ceasefire, though positions remain far apart. 53 Naypyitaw had reportedly sought the return of several townships in southern Rakhine State, a demand its foe is unlikely to accept given the military’s lack of leverage on the ground. 54 For its part, the Arakan Army has previously called on the military to withdraw entirely from the state, which is equally unrealistic without a decisive confrontation. 55 Despite controlling nearly all of Rakhine, the group faces constraints: its offensive on Kyaukphyu town has largely stalled, while dislodging the military from the heavily defended capital, Sittwe, would likely be costly and protracted. 56 Meanwhile, humanitarian conditions in the areas the group controls continue to deteriorate due to military blockades and regular airstrikes. 57
While the Arakan Army retains strong local support and can sustain the conflict in the near term, a prolonged war is not in its interest.
While the Arakan Army retains strong local support and can sustain the conflict in the near term, a prolonged war is not in its interest. 58 A basis for a tactical ceasefire therefore exists. Media reports suggest that the military has sought Chinese assistance in facilitating talks. 59 But while Beijing has some influence over the group, it likely lacks the leverage to compel it into an agreement. It may encourage one through a mix of pressure, security assurances and economic incentives. But even such a deal would leave the Arakan Army able to harry the military through proxy resistance forces on the state’s periphery, and the group would remain committed to its goal of controlling all of Rakhine. 60
In the north, the KIO remains the principal armed group still engaged in large-scale fighting with the military. Since returning to the battlefield after the coup, it has consolidated control of key territory and expanded its economic base. It has in particular strengthened its hold around the jade mining hub of Hpakant where, despite the town itself remaining under the military’s thumb, it dominates surrounding areas and key access routes, allowing it to tax the multi-billion-dollar jade trade through checkpoints and informal levies. 61 It has also taken over the Pangwa area in Chipwi township on the Chinese border, displacing a military-aligned Border Guard Force that had overseen rare earth mining there. 62 Alongside gold mining and other extractive activities, the rare earths have provided the group with substantial revenue to sustain its armed struggle.
Control of the Pangwa-Chipwi belt, in Kachin state, has wider strategic implications. This area is now one of the world’s largest sources of heavy rare earth elements, particularly dysprosium and terbium, supplying a major share of global demand for inputs used in electric vehicles, wind turbines and advanced weapons systems, with most output exported to China for processing. 63 By securing territory that hosts this production, the KIO has therefore acquired indirect leverage over a supply chain of vital importance to Chinese industry. Partly for this reason, Beijing has been more cautious in pressing the KIO into a ceasefire than it has with other northern groups, such as the MNDAA and TNLA, despite its strong interest in border stability. Yet the leverage is double-edged: China remains highly sensitive to disruptions in supply and is likely to act decisively if it perceives risks to resource flows or signs of untrustworthiness from the armed group.
Given these dynamics, and the difficulty the KIO has faced in translating battlefield momentum into control of major towns, it could find a ceasefire more attractive over time. Despite sustained efforts, it has been unable to secure Bhamo – a major population centre on the Ayeyarwady (Irrawaddy) river and a gateway to central Myanmar – highlighting the limits of its offensive capacity against heavily defended urban positions. Holding territory is also increasingly costly, particularly in areas exposed to airstrikes and with vulnerable civilian populations. A ceasefire that consolidates its existing gains including resource-rich areas, reduces military pressure and provides respite for residents may be appealing, especially if accompanied by economic or security incentives from China. 64
For Naypyitaw, deals with the Arakan Army and KIO would relieve battlefield pressure and allow it to concentrate forces on other opponents.
For Naypyitaw, deals with the Arakan Army and KIO would relieve battlefield pressure and allow it to concentrate forces on other opponents. One objective would be to push the Karen National Union (KNU) further away from the Hpa-an to Myawaddy corridor, the key overland trade route with Thailand, as well as to recapture a string of towns and bases along the border that the group has seized since the coup. 65 Informal deals with individual KNU brigades – which have long operated with a high degree of autonomy – may be possible, but a comprehensive ceasefire with the group as a whole seems much less likely. 66 In neighbouring Kayah (Karenni) State, the military is likely to tighten the squeeze on the Karenni National Progressive Party and its allies, which are already on the back foot and could be confined in a narrow band of territory away from key towns and roads. 67
Prospects for ceasefire deals with post-coup resistance forces – militias set up to protect communities from military repression and to fight against the regime – remain more distant. The military leadership, which continues to view these groups primarily as traitors, has consistently vowed to crush them. 68 Its approach is thus likely to combine sustained military pressure with incentives for surrender. 69 Over time, however, it may come to see some resistance forces – particularly those operating alongside or embedded within ethnic armed groups – as candidates for local agreements, especially where these can be folded into ceasefires with the ethnic armies. But it is unlikely to adopt such an approach with those aligned with the NUG, which seeks the overthrow of the military and its permanent removal from politics.
The prospects for broader political dialogue are even more remote. The emergence of a new administration in Naypyitaw does not represent a moment of political compromise, and the military has historically shown little willingness to negotiate from a position of weakness. Although battlefield fortunes have shifted in the military’s favour over the past two years, it remains substantially weaker than before the coup. It thus has less leverage to apply and fewer incentives to offer, while its main battlefield opponents, having gained ground militarily, would bring expansive demands to any talks. There are also few indications that Naypyitaw has the appetite for meaningful engagement with the NUG, and it seems even less likely that the latter would enter dialogue without substantial preconditions. 70
While it is too early to assess what the administration’s approach will be, Min Aung Hlaing’s initial comments suggest that it will continue holding token meetings around the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement – concluded in 2015 as a step toward a comprehensive settlement – as largely symbolic cover for transactional truces, with limited participation and little prospect of substantive progress. 71 Few influential armed groups remain part of the formal peace process, and the political concessions that once underpinned it – greater autonomy and minority rights backed by constitutional reforms – are no longer on offer or credible.
IV. Evolving Foreign Ties
Myanmar’s external environment is shifting in ways that favour the authorities in Naypyitaw – a trend that is likely to deepen in the post-election landscape. China’s more assertive backing, combined with a broader regional drift toward pragmatic engagement and scant attention from Western states, is reducing the country’s isolation and reshaping the terms of its diplomatic engagement.
A. China’s Expanded Influence
On 30 August 2025, Xi Jinping sat down with Min Aung Hlaing in Tianjin, on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit – their first bilateral meeting on Chinese soil. 72 This tête-à-tête marked a strategic pivot by Beijing, with long-term consequences for Myanmar’s reliance on China. It heralded a phase of more active, high-level ties with Naypyitaw and brought a flurry of diplomatic and economic interactions between the two countries. 73
After Tianjin, Min Aung Hlaing travelled to Beijing to attend the high-profile military parade commemorating the 80th anniversary of Japan’s surrender at the end of World War II. The visit offered rare international exposure for the junta leader: he was photographed with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and also met Russian President Vladimir Putin, as well as the Malaysian and Indonesian heads of state. 74 The event was part of a broader effort by Beijing to shape an alternative to the U.S.-led order, with itself at the centre, at a time of perceived U.S. retreat and policy volatility. For Naypyitaw, it signalled the prospect of inclusion in a more permissive, authoritarian-leaning international coterie of states.
China’s attitude toward Myanmar’s leaders has changed considerably since the 2021 coup. At first, extremely unhappy with the military’s seizure of power, China pushed the generals hard to reach an accommodation with Aung San Suu Kyi. When the junta refused, Beijing showed its disapproval, refraining from recognising Min Aung Hlaing as head of state and allowing the first-ever UN Security Council resolution on Myanmar to pass in December 2022. 75 Its frustration grew as Naypyitaw failed to act against scam centres along the Chinese border that were bilking Chinese nationals. In response, Beijing greenlighted Operation 1027 – a coordinated offensive by ethnic armed groups that, starting in October 2023, inflicted significant losses on the military and its allies. This move marked a shift toward more direct intervention to protect Chinese interests and a major expansion of its influence. 76 Beijing’s role in securing ceasefires in 2025 between the military and the MNDAA and TNLA (see Section III.A above) underscored both the extent of its leverage over multiple groups and its readiness to use that clout. 77
As a result of Beijing’s tightening embrace, the regime – and Min Aung Hlaing personally – has become increasingly dependent on Beijing.
At the same time, with Western governments and many nearby states reluctant to engage the junta, China has deepened its contacts with Naypyitaw, providing diplomatic cover as well as military and economic support. 78 Driven by concern that mounting battlefield losses could precipitate the regime’s disorderly collapse, Beijing’s decision in August 2024 to back Min Aung Hlaing’s administration was pivotal in shoring up the military’s position on the ground and easing Naypyitaw’s diplomatic isolation. As a result of Beijing’s tightening embrace, the regime – and Min Aung Hlaing personally – has become increasingly dependent on Beijing. It is a deeply uncomfortable position for Myanmar, which has long feared domination by its giant neighbour, but it is one the current leadership has little choice but to accept. 79 In addition, closer alignment with China – as well as Russia – may yet offer Naypyitaw a strategic upside, particularly if the Middle East conflict shifts the geopolitical balance in these powers’ favour.
Beijing was particularly keen for the elections to proceed, preferring to deal with a nominally civilian administration rather than an overt military regime. It also calculated that the return to constitutional rule brought by elections would provide a more predictable institutional setup in Naypyitaw, allowing for longer-term planning and a more structured bilateral relationship. China’s special envoy for Myanmar, Deng Xijun, suggested in remarks in Naypyitaw after observing the first round of voting that the elections were held as part of a deal between Min Aung Hlaing and Xi Jinping, presumably reached at their August 2025 meeting in Tianjin. 80
After the elections’ third phase, China’s foreign ministry promptly welcomed their completion and expressed readiness to “continue deepening the comprehensive strategic cooperation with Myanmar”. 81 Xi was also one of the first foreign leaders to congratulate Min Aung Hlaing on his election as president, and Foreign Minster Wang Yi visited Naypyitaw shortly thereafter. 82 Under the new administration, China will undoubtedly deepen ties further, likely offering Min Aung Hlaing a long-sought official state visit to Beijing in the near future; so far, he has been invited only for the August 2025 working visit and to attend a set of regional summits in Kunming in November 2024. 83
Beijing’s backing for Naypyitaw should be understood as an effort to manage instability rather than resolve it.
That said, China’s support has not been unconditional: it has used its leverage to shape outcomes on the ground in line with its priorities, including maintaining stability along its frontier, restoring overland trade and securing continued access to natural resources, particularly rare earths. 84 More broadly, China is focused on advancing projects linked to the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, connecting Yunnan to the Indian Ocean seaboard in Rakhine State – a long-term strategic objective that it is likely to pursue more actively under the new administration. 85 Achieving progress in these projects will require pragmatic engagement with powerful armed groups controlling territory along the corridor, particularly the Arakan Army in Rakhine State. Consequently, Beijing’s backing for Naypyitaw should be understood as an effort to manage instability rather than resolve it. China has helped prevent a disorderly collapse of the regime and stabilise key border areas, but it likely sees little prospect of addressing the political and territorial fragmentation underlying Myanmar’s conflict.
A concrete way in which China’s backing for the new administration could be reflected is Myanmar’s representation at the UN. Since the coup, Myanmar’s seat in New York has been held by the permanent representative appointed under the pre-coup NLD-led government, who is aligned with the NUG. While the regime submitted credentials for its own nominee, the UN General Assembly’s Credentials Committee has repeatedly deferred consideration of the issue. 86 It is very likely that China will push for a decision to seat the Myanmar authorities’ nominee, now that a nominally civilian administration backed by Beijing sits in Naypyitaw. The timing, however, is uncertain. The Credentials Committee is not scheduled to meet until November, which would mean that the status quo would persist through the General Assembly’s high-level week in September, when world leaders gather in New York. Whatever the case, Naypyitaw will remain highly focused on its representation at the UN, which will continue to set the tone of its engagement with the body until the matter is resolved to its satisfaction. 87
B. Other Regional Players
Other countries in the region have adjusted their policies in response to Myanmar’s shifting political and battlefield realities, as well as to China’s deepening role. India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have both moved in the direction of greater engagement, and both look set to normalise relations with the new administration in Naypyitaw.
India’s posture has gone through several phases. In the immediate aftermath of the coup, New Delhi maintained its longstanding preference for pragmatic engagement with Naypyitaw. But as the military lost control of large stretches of the shared border, the Indian government began to hedge, recognising that relations with the regime alone were insufficient to manage strategic and security concerns in its restive north east. 88 In particular, New Delhi began to have more formal political engagement with armed groups operating along its border, such as the Arakan Army and Chin National Front, moving beyond earlier informal contacts by regional authorities or local border security forces. 89
While India has not abandoned its outreach to armed groups that still control much of the border, its focus has shifted back to Naypyitaw.
But China’s move in August 2024 to shore up the regime prompted a further recalibration. New Delhi shifted back toward closer engagement with Naypyitaw, resuming high-level contacts, including an April 2025 meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Min Aung Hlaing on the sidelines of a regional summit in Bangkok, and a further bilateral on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Tianjin in August. 90 Indian officials judged that, with Beijing’s backing, the military was unlikely to collapse in the near term, and wished to avoid ceding influence to China. 91 While India has not abandoned its outreach to armed groups that still control much of the border, its focus has shifted back to Naypyitaw. It was among the few countries to send official election observers and provide technical support for the polls, and it dispatched Minister of State for External Affairs Kirti Vardhan Singh to Min Aung Hlaing’s 10 April inauguration. 92 On 30 May, Min Aung Hlaing made an official five-day visit to India, his first foreign trip since being appointed president. 93
ASEAN’s approach has also shifted, albeit without full consensus. Following the coup, the grouping adopted a restrictive stance, limiting political-level engagement with the generals. But as the conflict dragged on, and China moved to stabilise the regime, several member states began to recalibrate. Thailand has been at the forefront of efforts to ease Myanmar’s diplomatic isolation, while Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia have also favoured more engagement. 94 The March 2025 earthquake in Myanmar provided additional cover for renewed contacts, with regional leaders using humanitarian diplomacy to justify higher-level interaction with Naypyitaw, thereby weakening the diplomatic quarantine. 95 For their part, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and, to some extent, the Philippines have favoured a more principled approach.
Since the elections, ASEAN divisions have widened further. An ever-shrinking number of members continue to resist full diplomatic normalisation, while others have in effect abandoned the agreed-upon restrictions. The result is a gradual, de facto easing of Myanmar’s isolation rather than a formal policy shift, with decisions increasingly driven by national interests and broader geopolitics rather than collective ASEAN positions. Thailand has sought to establish itself as the lead on Myanmar, reflecting its status as the front-line ASEAN state most directly affected by the situation across the border. 96
With a nominally civilian administration now in place in Naypyitaw, backed by key partners including China and India, the centre of gravity within ASEAN has shifted toward those favouring normalisation. The grouping’s leaders are increasingly frustrated by the time and political capital consumed by internal debates on Myanmar, with little prospect of progress, reinforcing incentives to move toward a more pragmatic approach. 97 But while the direction of travel appears clear, the pace of this shift remains uncertain, given that any formal reversal of the decision to bar representatives from Myanmar’s post-coup authorities from ASEAN meetings would require consensus at the leaders’ level. There was no consensus on this at the May summit in Cebu, but there was agreement for the bloc’s foreign ministers to hold an online consultation with their Myanmar counterpart in July. 98 As ASEAN chair for 2026, the Philippines has so far focused on other priorities, particularly the South China Sea disputes, leaving little bandwidth for Myanmar. 99
But looming legal developments could complicate this picture (see Section II.B above). A possible ICC arrest warrant for Min Aung Hlaing for alleged crimes against humanity against the Rohingya, alongside the forthcoming judgment in the ICJ case on alleged genocide, could damage the new administration’s international standing. Depending on their scope and timing, these developments could constrain Min Aung Hlaing’s travel and shape both the extent and optics of engagement by countries in the region and beyond. Indications of acute anxiety in Naypyitaw ahead of the ICJ decision suggest the authorities are alert to these risks. 100 If the ICJ finds that Myanmar committed genocide (as distinct from breaching other obligations under the Genocide Convention, such as the duty to prevent), it would mark the first time the court has found a state responsible for the commission of genocide. 101
Such legal outcomes would make hosting Min Aung Hlaing more sensitive and legally complicated for some countries. They might even deter him from undertaking such travel – a particular challenge for ASEAN, given the expectation that heads of state attend regular summits.
C. Western Countries
Since the 2021 coup, Western governments have paid little heed to developments in Myanmar, compared to other foreign policy issues, and the crisis has steadily lost ground to other priorities. Attention has been dominated by higher-profile crises, particularly those closer to home and posing more immediate security and geopolitical challenges, notably the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. The West has thus been largely reactive in its approach to Myanmar, with policy focused on maintaining targeted sanctions and providing aid, rather than pursuing new political initiatives. Aid allocations have also been considerably reduced amid general fiscal belt-tightening and, for European countries, the priority of rearmament. 102
Most Western actors made explicit decisions not to engage with Myanmar’s elections and avoided actions that could be seen as conferring legitimacy. They did not recognise the polls as credible, and therefore they do not consider the new administration in Naypyitaw as legitimate. Washington, Brussels and others have limited their public statements on the elections, reflecting for most of them a deliberate effort to avoid drawing attention to the process, even by criticising it. 103 For example, prior to the polls, the European Union chose Human Rights Day (9 December) to issue a statement dismissing the elections and calling for an end to violence. 104 It then used the coup’s fifth anniversary to reiterate the position that the polls, at that point recently completed, were neither free nor fair. 105
At the same time, a degree of cautious engagement with the new administration is likely, by Brussels and others. The EU and its member states will seek to test the authorities’ approach while advocating for improvements in humanitarian access, action to rein in the illicit economy, and adherence to international humanitarian law and other human rights obligations. Foreign governments will need to walk a fine line, however, calibrating their engagement carefully to avoid implying political endorsement or granting Naypyitaw undeserved legitimacy.
Myanmar remains a low priority in Washington, with the Trump administration largely maintaining the existing sanctions framework.
U.S. policy is less predictable. Myanmar remains a low priority in Washington, with the Trump administration largely maintaining the existing sanctions framework. It has had no notable political engagement with Naypyitaw before or since the elections. Sharp cuts to U.S. overseas assistance have resulted in a steep reduction in funding for Myanmar, though limited allocations have resumed. 106 A policy review has been under way within the State Department since early in the administration’s term, but it has yet to produce an outcome. 107
Countering transnational crime against U.S. citizens, on the other hand, has become important for the Trump administration, with direct ramifications for Myanmar. In November, the State Department cited an official estimate that U.S. citizens lost at least $10 billion in 2024 to online scam operations run from South East Asia, including Myanmar. 108 Accordingly, Washington has continued to impose sanctions on armed groups in Myanmar with links to such criminal activity, seizing assets and offering rewards for information that leads to the recovery of fraud proceeds. 109 Also in November, the Federal Bureau of Investigation established a dedicated Scam Center Strike Force. 110
With U.S. foreign policy now more transactional, Washington could pivot toward closer contact with Naypyitaw, driven by strategic competition with China and interest in critical minerals. 111 There are already indications of a new willingness to engage where it serves specific administration objectives, including on trade and migration. For example, President Donald Trump’s 7 July 2025 tariff letter was addressed to junta leader Min Aung Hlaing in a head-of-state capacity, seemingly contradicting the U.S. position of not recognising the legitimacy of the coup; Min Aung Hlaing took the opportunity to write a fawning letter back to Trump two days later. 112 Washington has also reached practical arrangements with Naypyitaw on the return of Myanmar nationals scheduled for removal from the U.S., including deportation flights, pointing to a growing channel of transactional cooperation. 113 The Trump administration has also promoted trade ties, with its embassy in Yangon celebrating an agreement with a regime-linked businessman to purchase U.S. soybeans. 114
V. New Approaches from Abroad
The new administration taking over in Naypyitaw does not represent a political opening. Rather, it entrenches military rule with a civilian veneer, without addressing the underlying drivers of conflict and instability. At the same time, the evolving geopolitical environment – particularly China’s expanded influence – limits the leverage available to other foreign countries.
Against this backdrop, Myanmar risks slipping further off the international radar. That would be regrettable, not just because the conflict there remains Asia’s deadliest, with dramatic consequences for millions of people, but because the country’s crisis has profound implications beyond its borders: the expansion of transnational organised crime, including large-scale scam operations that now affect citizens around much of the world, narcotics trafficking and related financial crime and human trafficking; the growing strategic importance of critical minerals dug up in conflict zones; and rising informal migration flows driven by economic collapse and conscription. Even with the multiplication of armed conflicts, developments in Myanmar are not a peripheral humanitarian concern, but an important source of regional instability and global risk. Given Myanmar’s impact on various issues of global concern – particularly in relation to organised crime, financial integrity, critical mineral supply chains and geopolitical competition – the country should be a priority for both Western and regional governments.
[Foreign power’s] focus should … be on mitigating harm to the population, limiting transnational spillover and preserving space for future political change.
Foreign powers should approach Myanmar with the recognition that, despite the authorities’ lack of legitimacy and continuing instability, the military is unlikely to collapse in the near term, particularly given Chinese backing. Efforts to isolate Naypyitaw are therefore unlikely to yield meaningful political change and risk reducing external influence on issues of growing regional and international concern. The focus should instead be on mitigating harm to the population, limiting transnational spillover and preserving space for future political change.
First, foreign governments should maintain a policy of limited, issue-specific engagement with Naypyitaw, focused on areas of core concern or where dialogue may yield concrete benefits, including the ability to pass difficult messages. These include humanitarian access, protection of civilians and cooperation on transnational crime (for more on the last matter, see below). Such engagement should be carefully calibrated to avoid providing the administration with legitimacy or diluting existing measures. Coordination among key partners will be important to prevent Naypyitaw from playing different governments off one another. This approach is rooted in the understanding that while the regime is unlikely to undertake meaningful reforms, it may respond to advocacy on discrete issues.
Secondly, while targeted sanctions have not altered the regime’s behaviour, they continue to constrain military procurement, impose costs on military-linked business and signal continued international opposition to abuses. Countries that have targeted sanctions in place should maintain and, where necessary, update these measures, focused on specific individuals, entities and revenue streams connected to the military and its commercial ventures. 115
Thirdly, despite the competing priorities they are faced with, donors should maintain and, if possible, boost their aid budgets for humanitarian assistance and socio-economic stabilisation, recognising that the economic shock linked to the Middle East conflict will deepen hardship for millions in Myanmar. While the new administration in Naypyitaw will likely argue that aid must go through official channels, it is important that humanitarian and livelihood assistance continue to be delivered through non-state channels, including cross-border mechanisms where possible. A large proportion of Myanmar’s territory is in the hands of non-state authorities, or under contestation, and Naypyitaw imposes heavy – but not always insurmountable – restrictions on humanitarian access to these areas. Donors should also make sure that funding rules are flexible to account for possible changes in territorial control. At the same time, they should remain attentive to the gendered impact of the crisis, including in relation to migration and risks of trafficking and exploitation.
Fourthly, foreign states should increase cooperation among themselves on transnational crime, which has become a central feature of Myanmar’s conflict economy and a growing regional and global concern. They should take coordinated action against scam centres and related human trafficking, as well as the drug trade, including through engagement with governments across the region. In narrow instances, they could work with the relevant Myanmar authorities if necessary, though Naypyitaw’s weak law enforcement capabilities, lack of territorial control of criminal enclaves and endemic corruption limit the scope for effective cooperation. 116
Given its welcome interest in this subject and the reach of its diplomatic, law enforcement, financial and intelligence institutions, the U.S. could play an important coordinating role alongside regional states. Efforts to disrupt illicit financial flows should focus on those linked to transnational organised crime, including through enhanced financial intelligence sharing, coordinated investigations, arrests, sanctions designations, asset seizures and anti-money laundering enforcement. But it should avoid broader measures that risk financially isolating Myanmar as a whole, which would harm the wider economy and population.
Policymakers should recognise that China will remain the decisive external power in Myanmar.
Fifthly, policymakers should recognise that China will remain the decisive external power in Myanmar. Efforts to shape the future peace and security of the country will therefore require engagement – direct or indirect – with Beijing, particularly on issues such as ceasefires, scam centres and resource governance. Other countries will need to be pragmatic about China’s central role, seeking to shape its policies rather than countering them.
Finally, while prospects for a comprehensive peace or political dialogue remain remote, external powers should continue to support conditions that could enable future political change, including sustaining civil society – particularly women-led organisations – independent media and, where possible, non-state governance structures. Even in the absence of near-term reform, maintaining these foundations will be important for a long-term resolution of Myanmar’s civil war.
VI. Conclusion
Myanmar’s new administration is not a political transition but a consolidation of military rule under a constitutional framework drafted by the armed forces. It does not address the underlying drivers of the conflict or the interlinked crises of state fragmentation, armed contestation and economic decline. The battlefield remains fluid, with the military regaining ground in some areas but remaining unable to defeat its strongest opponents. Ceasefires, where they emerge, are likely to be tactical and unstable, while prospects for meaningful political dialogue remain remote. In the absence of a major change in internal or external conditions, the country is likely to remain locked in protracted conflict, with growing domestic hardship and transnational consequences including organised crime and human trafficking.
At the same time, shifting relations with foreign powers – particularly China’s expanding influence and a broader regional drift toward engagement – are reducing Myanmar’s diplomatic isolation. While some states may seek to shelve their resistance to the pseudo-civilian authorities and forge diplomatic ties anew, a more guarded response from foreign governments would better serve the cause of peace and the interests of Myanmar’s people.